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INTRODUCTION

The Community Reinvestment Act of 19771 (CRA) has been called many
things. For some, it represents a lifeline, as community reinvestment advocates,
working in conjunction with banks, have generated trillions of dollars in
desperately needed capital investment in communities that historically have
been excluded from mainstream banking and community development
activities. For others, it is a burden, reflecting misguided judgments about the
proper role of regulatory oversight in capital allocation. Still others believe it is
an abomination, one that spurred the mortgage crisis and the financial fallout
that has followed.
Born out of the Civil Rights Movement, Congress adopted the CRA at a
time when many low- and moderate-income communities, often communities of
color, were denied basic banking services such as home lending and small
business investment. Advocates argued that when the federal government
guaranteed bank deposits through federal deposit insurance, it created a social
compact. That compact served as a justification for expecting that institutions
accepting such insurance should have to meet the needs of the communities
making those deposits. Federal deposit insurance made bank customers
confident in their bank's holdings, which in turn made the business of
banking-lending-possible and became a justification for the adoption of the
CRA.
In the thirty years since the CRA's adoption, the banking industry has been
transformed. Banks are global in their reach and their outlook. Banks, in all of
their forms, are no longer brick-and-mortar institutions on Main Street that take
deposits from the grocer and lend to the baker. Instead, they manage
investments from Dubai and China and use those funds to build roads in North
Africa, set up cell phone service in Argentina, and construct oil rigs in Siberia.
And the CRA, which Congress designed to ensure that banks would meet the
credit needs of the low- and moderate-income communities-the communities
of the grocer and the baker-proved a weak bulwark against the subprime
mortgage crisis; unsafe and unsound lending practices have decimated the same
communities that the CRA was supposed to protect. These practices promise to
set many communities back decades economically and socially, leaving a wake
of foreclosed homes-a true nightmare on Elm Street, and Maple Street, and
Pine Street.
As the subprime mortgage meltdown has spurred the wider financial crisis,
some commentators have blamed the CRA, passed in 1977, for the events that
began to unfold twenty-five years later. According to the theory, the CRA

1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (2006).
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forced banks to engage in risky loans to risky borrowers in risky
neighborhoods-predominantly in low-income and minority communities. If it
were not for this decades-old law and aggressive efforts by community
advocates promoting compliance with it, commentators posit that events in the
earlier part of this decade, where questionable loans were extended on
unfavorable terms to borrowers that could not afford them, might have turned
out differently. Were it not for this law and the power of community-based
groups that championed it, the argument goes, long-standing underwriting
principles would not have given way to exotic loans made to borrowers who
had no business owning a home. While this theory might offer cold comfort to
those who believe that banks, left to their own devices, will act with prudence,
the theory cannot stand up to any sober assessment of the subprime mortgage
meltdown and the financial crisis that has followed.
In fact, this argument is hard to reconcile under any reading of the statute's
terms and after any assessment of the CRA's true reach. In this Article, while I
address the question of whether the CRA is to blame for the subprime mortgage
crisis because it somehow forced banks to engage in risky behavior, I also take
a slightly different tack. Although I explain why these critics are wrong about
their assessment of the CRA's role in the subprime mortgage crisis, I recognize
that the CRA has limitations. Several facts expose the true role of the CRA in
the subprime mortgage crisis, however. For example, the CRA was not too
strong, but rather too weak. The CRA's limitations gave banks and their
regulators broad discretion to carry out the CRA's goals. This fact, coupled with
the approach of federal bank regulators towards subprime lending generally and
the failure of the courts to serve as a check on administrative neglect under the
CRA, meant that instead of causing the subprime mortgage crisis, the CRA
simply failed to prevent the crisis. The CRA was not strong enough, and it
allowed banks and regulators free rein to ignore the central premise of the Act:
that banks must meet the needs of the communities they serve consistent with
safe and sound banking practices.
It is within this phrase, the key statutory directive under the CRA-"to
encourage [banks] to help meet the credit needs of the local communities...
consistent with the safe and sound" banking practices, 2 which is the articulated
letter and spirit of the law-that we recognize the seeds of the subprime debacle
that has swept the globe. First, at the height of the housing bubble that saw the
explosive growth of subprime lending, banks covered by the CRA rarely made
subprime loans in such a way that would give them CRA credit; instead, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, institutions not covered by the CRA issued the
subprime loans. Second, the geographic location of the "communities" 3 the

2. Id. § 2901(b).
3. Id.
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banks served could easily be manipulated, so when traditional banks did engage
in subprime lending, it was typically outside of the communities they served for
the purposes of the CRA. Third, risky lending all too often carried out in lowand moderate-income communities and communities of color by nonbank
lenders-precisely because borrowers in such communities tended to be
unsophisticated and unwary-could hardly be considered "consistent with the
safe and sound" 4 banking practices. Yet, regulators regularly turned a blind eye
to this conduct, considering it beyond the scope of the CRA and even stepping
in to prevent regulatory efforts to rein it in at the state level. Tragically, the
CRA's structure itself created gaping loopholes in coverage, which made it
possible for subprime lenders to operate freely-beyond the scope of the federal
oversight contemplated by the Act, and inconsistent with the Act's letter and
spirit.
This Article is structured as follows: In Part II, I offer a brief overview of
the subprime mortgage crisis and its impacts. In Part IlI, I provide an overview
of the CRA, including the legislative history, the structure, and the enforcement
mechanisms Congress adopted to carry out the CRA's core purpose. I also
assess the impact the CRA has had on promoting sound community lending and
investment practices in its thirty-year history. In Part IV, I attempt to determine
how the CRA and the manner in which it was enforced may have contributed to
the subprime mortgage crisis. I focus on the gaps in the CRA's coverage, the
federal regulators' position with respect to the CRA and subprime lenders, and
lending practices. In Part V, I examine the failure of the courts to serve as a
check on weak regulatory enforcement of the CRA. Finally, in Part VI, I
develop a series of principles to inform efforts to modernize the CRA to bring it
in line with the nature of banking in the twenty-first century. While such CRA
modernization might not correct the worst abuses of the subprime mortgage
market from the past, it might help to avoid similar crises in the future.
II.

THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MELTDOWN

As I have explained elsewhere, 5 key features of the subprime mortgage
crisis-a series of sparks that led to the conflagration that has swept up markets

4. Id.
5. See Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the
Social Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 282-300 (2008) (providing an overview ofthe
subprime mortgage crisis and listing several of its
causes) [hereinafter Brescia, Capital in Chaos];
Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the Fair Housing Act and
Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. GOv'T L. REV.

164, 168-75 (2009) (assessing the disproportionate impact of the subprime mortgage crisis on
black and Hispanic communities). For several sources of particularly helpful historical information
on the subprime mortgage crisis, see generally Possible Responses to Rising Mortgage
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across the globe and has far reaching effects in a wide range of sectors-include
the following. First and foremost, the mortgage industry operated with little
accountability. 6 This lack of accountability led to a heavy emphasis on
generating more and more mortgage loans, regardless of their quality
or their
•7
risk, for repackaging into securities and selling to voracious investors. These
phenomena created perverse incentives, which were ultimately fueled by a lack8
of regulatory oversight and by ratings agencies willing to endorse any debt.
Second, information asymmetries existed between prospective borrowers and
brokers because the industry representatives had greater information than the
borrowers about the mortgage market, the impact of exotic loan terms, and the
risks associated with expectations of perpetual growth in housing values. 9 Third,
as brokers and originators sought to continue the flow of mortgages into the
securitization stream, underwriting standards were weakened significantly in the
later years of the housing boom to bring in as many potential borrowers as
possible, regardless of the relative risk. 0The spigot needed to flow with the
same force in order to meet the ever-present demand for subprime securities and
to maintain profit levels for the brokers, the originators packaging the loans, and
the entities securitizing them. " In the end, little regard was paid to the quality of

Foreclosures: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on FinancialServs., I I0th Cong. 19-21 (2007)
(statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) [hereinafter Bair
Testimony] (assessing trends in securitization of subprime mortgage debt within the past ten
years); Mortgage Market Turmoil: Causes and Consequences: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, I I0th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Roger T. Cole, Director,
Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System) [hereinafter Cole Testimony] (discussing the impact of subprime lending); EDWARD M.
GRAMLICH,

SUBPRIME

MORTGAGES: AMERICA'S

LATEST

BOOM

AND BUST

1-35

(2007)

(providing analysis of trends in homeownership from the 1940s to the 2000s); Souphala
Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market,
88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 31, 32-40 (2006) (explaining subprime loans and providing

a history of subprime lending); Allan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: How Did It
Happen and How Will It End, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Summer 2007, at 13, 13-16 (providing an
overview of the origins of the subprime mortgage market). For more recent assessments of the
subprime mortgage market's collapse and its impact on the current financial crisis, see ROBERT J.
SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY'S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 29-38, 87-113 (2008); MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: A 360 LOOK AT
THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE IMPLOSION, AND HOW TO AVOID THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS (2008).

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See Brescia, Capital in Chaos, supra note 5, at 291.
See id.
Seeid. at301.
Id. at 291-92.
See id. at 312.
See Cole Testimony, supra note 5.
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these mortgages, and many borrowers undertook obligations they did not
understand and, ultimately, could not afford. 12
Not all borrowers were completely blameless, it is true. Some were
speculators who purchased investment properties with no money down and who
were equally responsible for banking on ever-increasing housing values. 13
Others knew the representations they made on loan applications were inflated or
completely fabricated. 14 Brokers and originators encouraged these borrowers to
continue making these representations. For too many borrowers, however,
exotic loan terms were beyond comprehension (or, as was more likely, lenders
never fully explained the terms), 16 and the cataclysm that ensued has enveloped
global markets and brought about a crisis that rivals only the Great Depression
in living memory.
Yet, a brief review of the features of the subprime market that ultimately
led to the market's demise does not explain the disproportionate impact of the
distortions of that market on black and Hispanic communities. Such a review,
therefore, fails to give a complete picture of one of the most deeply disturbing
aspects of the crisis-one that is likely to have lasting impacts for years to
come.
In 2006, the national homeownership rate hit an all-time high of nearly
69%.17 The expansion in the homeownership rate leading to this record high
was fueled in great part by an increase in homeownership in black and Hispanic
communities-communities
•. 18 that, traditionally, had lower homeownership rates
than white communities. Subprime loans fueled much of this expansion. In
2005, more than 50% of the conventional home purchase loans made to black
families had subprime features, and 46.1 % made to Hispanic families had such

12. See id.; The Role of the Secondary Market in Subprime Mortgage Lending: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions and Consumer Creditof the H. Comm. on Financial
Servs., 1I0th Cong. 104-05 (statement of Warren Kornfeld, Managing Director, Moody's
Investors Services); SHILLER, supra note 5, at 6-7; Krinsman, supra note 5, at 14-16 (citing Bair
Testimony, supra note 5, at 19; STANDARD & POOR'S, STANDARD & POOR'S WEIGHS IN ON THE
U.S. SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET 5 (2007)); John Kiff & Paul Mills, Money for Nothing and

Checks for Free: Recent Developments in U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets 4 (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. 07/188, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfhi?abstract id- 1006316&download-yes.
13. See Cole Testimony, supra note 5.
14. See Kiff& Mills, supranote 12, at 8-9.
15. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, CURBING
PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT 38-39 (2000), available at

http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf [hereinafter HUD-TREASURY REPORT].
16. See id. at 40.
17. Kiff& Mills, supranote 12, at 4 fig.1.
18. Seeid. at4n.4.
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features of conventional mortgages 19(compared to the 17.2% of conventional
mortgages for non-Hispanic whites).
In many ways, these communities were prime targets for the subprime
mortgage market's expansion, providing dry kindling for the sparks. The well..20
documented history of lending discrimination in these communities meant
minorities had fewer banking alternatives and had less familiarity with the
mortgage market. 2 1 These factors led many minority borrowers to accept loans
on less favorable terms than they would have received on the open market in the
absence of predatory conduct. 22 Instead, brokers and originators targeted
minority communities precisely because these communities provided an
untapped market for mortgages, as well as a customer pool with less
sophistication and fewer channels for receiving sensible, informed counseling
23
and advice.
A growing body of data shows that these forces steered many minority
borrowers to loans on unfavorable and more costly terms regardless of whether
these borrowers would have qualified for loan terms in the prime market. Of
mortgage refinance loans made in 1998, 39% of residents from upper income
black neighborhoods used subprime products when refinancing their existing
mortgages, compared to just 6% of residents of upper income white

19. Robert B. Avery et al., Higher-PricedHome Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data, FED.
RES. BULL. (Fed. Reserve Bd., Wash., D.C.), Sept. 8, 2006, at A123, A160 tbl.13, available at
http://www. federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/hmda/bull06hmda.pdf
20. For a history of discrimination in the home mortgage market in particular and in the
housing market in general, see DAN IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT TO THE COMMUNITY: COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT AND FAIR LENDING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 87-108 (2004); see also
Adam Gordon, The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in Banking Regulation
Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to Whites and Out of Reach for Blacks, 115
YALE L. J. 186, 209-11 (2005) (discussing how the regulatory system denied most black
Americans the opportunity to buy homes).
21. See HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 15, at 18.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 17 (noting reasons predatory lenders can flourish in communities of color);
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The CRA Implications of Predatory Lending, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1571, 1583-85 (2002) (citations omitted) (arguing that predatory lenders
flourish in markets underserved by traditional lenders). See generally ALVARO CORTES ET AL.,
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE HOMEOWNERSHIP OPPORTUNITIES FOR HISPANICS: CASE STUDIES OF

THREE MARKET AREAS 93-94 (2006), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/PDF/
hisp homeown2.pdf (studying practices of Hispanic communities in three urban settings and
finding that the lack of information about the mortgage process was the most significant barrier to
homeownership and access to home mortgage financing); Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It
Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 534-40 (2005)
(providing overview of economic reasons for failure of the mortgage market to serve certain
communities).
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neighborhoods. 2 4 At the same time, residents of low-income white
neighborhoods refinanced their homes using subprime products only 18% of the
time. 25 This data reveals that, at least in 1998, upper income residents of black
neighborhoods were more than twice as likely as low-income residents of white
neighborhoods to utilize subprime refinance products. 26 More recent research
on lending patterns found similar results and concluded that such disparities
were no accident but rather were likely the result of intentional-and illegal. 27
steering.
Analysis of the 2006 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data
revealed similar discrepancies between loans to whites and loans extended to
S28
blacks and Hispanics. For example, higher priced subprime lending occurred
in 53.7% of the conventional home-purchase loans made to blacks in that year,
29
compared to only 17.7% of similar loans made to non-Hispanic whites.
Controlling for some borrower and lender characteristics, subprime lending
occurred in 30.3% of the conventional loans made to blacks and 17.7% of loans
made to non-Hispanic whites-black borrowers were nearly twice as likely to
receive subprime loans as whites, even after taking borrower and lender
differences into account. Controlling for these same factors, Hispanics were
likely to enter into a subprime conventional home purchase loan 24% of the
31
time.
In terms of mortgage refinance agreements, again controlling for some
lender and borrower characteristics, subprime refinance loans were extended to

24.
25.
26.

HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 15, at48.
Id.
Id.

27. CAL. REINVESTMENT COAL. ET AL., PAYING MORE FOR THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE
SUBPRIME SHAKEOUT AND ITS IMPACT ON LOWER-INCOME AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES 4-5

(2008), available at http://nedap.org/resources/documents/MultistateHMDAReport-Final21.pdf
(analyzing activity of subprime lenders in seven metropolitan areas and finding that over 40% of
the loans by these entities were in predominantly minority neighborhoods while only 10% of their
loans were in predominantly white neighborhoods, "suggest[ing] that these neighborhoods were
targeted by high-risk lenders"). Another investigation showed a majority of subprime borrowers
were otherwise qualified for prime loans but ultimately agreed to enter into subprime loans. Rick
Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy: As Housing Boomed,
Industry Pushed Loans to a Broader Market, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 3, 2007, atAl (reporting that 610%
of subprime loans originated in 2006 "went to people with credit scores high enough to often
qualify for conventional [i.e., prime] loans with far better terms").
28. Robert B. Avery et al., The 2006 HMDA Data, FED. RES. BULL. (Fed. Reserve Bd.,
Wash., D.C.), Dec. 21, 2007, at A73, A95, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/
bulletin/2007/pdf/hmda06final.pdf
29. Id.
30. Id.atA96tbl.l1.
31. Id.
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blacks 33% of the time and to non-Hispanic whites 25.7% of the time (an
unexplained difference of 7.3%),32 while Hispanics received subprime refinance
33
loans 29.7% of the time.
Finally, the recently released 2007 HMDA data actually shows these
discrepancies improved slightly, perhaps as a result of the collapse of dozens of
subprime mortgage lenders and the radical changes in the market during 2007.
First of all, the data for 2007 reveals a 22% reduction in loan applications from
year.34
2006, and a 25% decrease in loan originations from just the previous
One hundred sixty-nine institutions that reported loans under HMDA in 2006
ceased operations in 2007 and did not merge into other institutions.35 These 169
institutions represented 7% of the aggregate loans originated in 2006. 36 What is
striking about these institutions is that the percentage of higher priced loans
originated to blacks and Hispanics was much higher than the percentage of
higher priced loans originated to these groups by all lending institutions: 73.9%
for blacks and 63.4% for Hispanics by these now-defunct
lenders, compared to
37
50.7% and 37%, respectively, by all other lenders.
Because these lenders left the market, there was a significant overall
reduction in the incidence of lending in the higher priced segment of the market.
As this segment of lenders focused on lending to black borrowers, higher priced
lending to this population dropped significantly-from 53.7% 38 in 2006 to
29.5% in the second half of 2007. 39 Higher priced lending to non-Hispanic
whites dropped to 9.2%. 40 Controlling for certain borrower and lender
characteristics, just as in previous years, still left an 11.1% difference between

32. Id.
33. Id. Other studies confirm a disproportionate share of subprime loans going to minority
borrowers, even controlling for creditworthiness and other factors. See, e.g., PAUL S. CALEM ET
AL., THE NEIGHBORHOOD DISTRIBUTION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LENDING 12 (2003), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id-478581&download-yes (using regression
analysis and concluding that even after controlling for other variables, "the percent of African
American homeowners is strongly, positively correlated with subprime share of neighborhood
loans"); Paul S. Calem et al., Neighborhood Patterns of Subprime Lending: Evidence from
Disparate Cities, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 603, 618 (2004) (analyzing statistical data and
determining that subprime lenders target minority neighborhoods).
34. Robert B. Avery et al., The 2007 HMDA Data, FED. RES. BULL. (Fed. Reserve Bd.,
Wash., D.C.), Dec. 23, 2008, at A107, A108-09, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/
bulletin/2008/pdf/hmda07final.pdf
35. Id. at A109. All but two of these institutions were independent mortgage companies,
thus, entities functioning beyond the scope ofthe CRA. Id. at A125.
36. Id. atAl09-10.
37. Id. atAl26tbl.12.
38. Supra note 28 and accompanying text.
39. Avery et al., supra note 34, at Al 39.
40. Id.
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black borrowers receiving higher priced loans and non-Hispanic whites
receiving such loans. 4 1 The numbers for Hispanics were similar: controlling for
certain borrower and lender characteristics still left a 6.2% difference between
higher priced loans being made to Hispanics and similar loans made to non42
Hispanic whites.
Some commentators have attempted to look to the root causes of the
subprime mortgage crisis and blame the CRA for the meteoric rise and
precipitous fall of the U.S. housing market. 43 According to these commentators,
the CRA forced banks to make risky loans to unworthy borrowers-particularly
minority borrowers-who were not able to make their mortgage payments.
Responding to misplaced, unfair criticism and public and political pressure,
banks made these risky loans; the failure of these loans caused potentially
irreparable damage to the global financial system. As the following discussion
shows, however, these arguments have the distinct misfortune of being gang
tackled by the facts.
The rest of this Article is dedicated to answering the following two
questions: First, did the CRA cause the subprime mortgage crisis, as some
commentators would suggest? Second, why did the CRA fail to prevent the
subprime mortgage crisis? In answering these questions, I will look to the
structure, history, and purposes of the CRA since its adoption by Congress in
1977. 1 will review the track record of the regulators enforcing the CRA and the

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g.,
Howard Husock, Op-Ed., Housing Goals We Can't Afford, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 2008, atA49 (arguing that because ofthe 1995 changes to the CRA, banks were "judged not on
how their loans performed but on how many ...loans [tolow-income borrowers] they made,"
therefore undermining "the regulatory emphasis on safety and soundness"); Terry Jones, Editorial,
Congress Lies Low to Avoid Bailout Blame, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Sep. 18, 2008, available at
2008 WL 17760567 (claiming that the financial crisis stems from the Carter era and the creation of
the CRA, which "forced banks to lend to uncreditworthy borrowers, mostly in minority areas,"
throwing banking prudence "out the window"); Charles Krauthammer, Op-Ed., Catharsis, Then
Common Sense, WASH. POST, Sep. 26, 2008, atA23 (blaming the CRA for putting "tremendous
pressure on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac-which in turn pressured banks and other lenders-to
extend mortgages to people who were borrowing over their heads"); Russell Roberts, Op-Ed., How
Government Stoked the Mania: Housing Prices Would Never Have Risen So High Without
Multiple Washington Mistakes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2008, at A21 (blaming the CRA for
"encourage[ing] banks to serve two masters-their bottom line and the so-called common good"
and for "pressuring banks to serve poor borrowers and poor regions of the country" so that
"politicians could push for increases in home ownership and urban development without having to
commit budgetary dollars"); Martin Hutchinson, Despite the G20 'sLatest Missteps, Reason for
Economic Optimism Remains, MONEY MORNING/THE MONEY MAP REPORT, Nov. 19, 2008,

http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/11/19/g20-meeting (claiming the CRA "forced banks to lend
large sums of money to [those] who couldn't pay itback-creating the subprime-mortgage
market").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss3/4

10

Brescia: Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure: The Financial Crisis and

2009]

COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT

role courts have played-or not played-in ensuring compliance with the
CRA's terms. The answers to the two questions set forth above can be found in
several important aspects of the CRA that many critics do not seem to grasp.
First and foremost, the CRA covers just a small percentage of subprime
loans, and the overwhelming majority of subprime
lending took place well
• 44
outside the scope of the CRA and its regulations. Next, the regulatory culture
that has dominated CRA enforcement for at least the last eight years has meant
that regulators have failed to check predatory subprime lending a number of
times: first, when they were asked, yet failed, to close some regulatory
45
loopholes that exempted much of the subprime lending from CRA review;
second, when they moved to preempt state efforts to rein in abuses in the
subprime market; 4 6 and third, when their review of bank activities under the
CRA became little more than a rubber stamp of approval. 47 Finally, courts have
placed judicial review of the regulators' conduct in enforcing the CRA beyond
the reach of advocates looking to pressure regulators to take a harder line on
48
CRA enforcement.
The following Sections review these phenomena. From this review, it is
easy to see that the CRA did not cause the subprime mortgage crisis-mostly
because the CRA was practically irrelevant to subprime lending. At the same
time, given the manner in which regulators charged with ensuring compliance
with the CRA enforced it, the CRA was powerless to prevent the subprime
crisis. Designed to fight the last war, the CRA became the financial equivalent
of the Maginot Line: easily circumvented, lightly defended, and quickly
overrun.
111.

THE CRA: HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND IMPACT

The Civil Rights Movement, informed by evidence of widespread
discrimination in the housing and lending contexts, helped to usher in a wave of
statutes designed to combat discriminatory practices with respect to renting and
selling real estate, including discrimination in mortgage lending. 49 These

44. See discussion infra Part V.A.
45. See discussion infra Part V.B.
46. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
47. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
48. See discussion infra Part V.
49. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Star. 81 (1968) (barring
discrimination in real estate transactions, including, inter alia, rental, sale, and mortgage
transactions) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3533, 3535, 3601-19 (2006)); Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (barring discrimination in the extension
of credit) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2006)). The Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) is also intended to provide some protections against predatory
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statutes combat rejection of renters, buyers, and borrowers on account of such
grounds as race and ethnicity, among others. Additionally, the statutes prohibit
the imposition of burdensome terms in the housing and mortgage lending
contexts on such grounds. In the 1970s, after the exposure of the practice of
"redlining"-the decision by banking institutions to exclude certain
communities from the provision of bank services, particularly mortgage
lending-Congress enacted two statutes, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA)50 and the CRA, 5 1 which were designed, respectively, to measure bank
lending practices and to ensure that banking entities properly serve low- and
moderate-income communities.
While the Fair Housing Act 52 (FHA) and the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act 53 (ECOA) bar affirmative acts of discrimination like the denial of housing
accommodations, 54 the denial of the extension of credit, 55 as well as the
imposition of discriminatory terms on housing 56 and credit, 57 the HMDA does
not prohibit any particular conduct. Rather, the Act promotes transparency by
requiring covered lenders to report on their lending activities by disclosing
certain demographic and economic information about their loan extensions and
denials.58
Like HMDA, the CRA does not itself bar discrimination; instead, as
described below, it mandates that covered banks meet the needs of the
communities
they
serve-including
lowand
moderate-income
communities -consistent
with safe and sound lending practices. 60 Like

lending by requiring certain loan term disclosures. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639, 1648 (2006). HOEPA's
protections are only triggered when a mortgage's interest rates are extremely high-even higher
than most of the worst subprime loans. See GRAMLICH, supra note 5, at28. During the height of
the subprime market, HOEPA's disclosure requirements applied to only about one percent of
subprime loans. Id.Recent data reveals that as of 2007 and with the collapse of the subprime
market, the percentage of loans covered by HOEPA has actually fallen to 0.2% of all loan
originations. Avery etal., supra note 19, atAl 20. Because HOEPA's coverage is so limited, I will
not discuss itatany length here.
50. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Star. 1124 (1975) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (2006)). For an overview of this act and its legislative history,
see Nat'l State Bank, Elizabeth, N.J. v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 984, 986 (3d Cir. 1980).
51. Community Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Star. 1111 (1977) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2006)). For an overview of the CRA and its legislative
history, see RICHARD D. MARSICO, DEMOCRATIZING CAPITAL: THE HISTORY, LAW, AND REFORM
OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 11 -28 (2005).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f(2006).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a).
58. 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (2006).
59. The CRA regulations define "income levels" of different communities as follows:

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss3/4

12

Brescia: Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure: The Financial Crisis and

2009]

COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT

HMDA, the CRA does not create a private right of action for a violation of its
provisions; rather, federal bank regulators enforce the CRA by grading covered
banks on their overall CRA performance and then •taking •that 61record into
account when those banks seek approval
The CRA
••62 of
• certain transactions.
does not prohibit any particular discriminatory conduct. Furthermore, although
the legislative history indicates that Congress was concerned about the
exclusion of minority communities, as well as other communities, 63 from
traditional banking services, 64 the language of the CRA on y explicitly
addresses bank lending in low- and moderate-income communities.
Looking to the language of the statute, the CRA does not mandate that
banks 66meet lending quotas for the low- and moderate-income communities they
serve. The CRA explicitly establishes congressional findings that motivated
the Act's adoption, as well as the Act's purpose:
(a) The Congress finds that-(1) regulated financial institutions are
required by law to demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the
convenience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered
to do business; (2) the convenience and needs of communities include

(1) Low-income, which means an individual income that is less than 50 percent of the
area median income, or a median family income that is less than 50 percent, in the case
of a geography.
(2) Moderate-income, which means an individual income that is at least 50 percent and
less than 80 percent of the area median income, or a median family income that is at
least 50 and less than 80 percent, in the case of a geography.
(3) Middle-income, which means an individual income that is at least 80 percent and less
than 120 percent of the area median income, or a median family income that is at least
80 and less than 120 percent, in the case of a geography.
(4) Upper-income, which means an individual income that is 120 percent or more ofthe
area median income, or a median family income that is 120 percent or more, in the case
of a geography.
12 C.F.R. § 25.12(m) (2008).
60. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006).
61. Id. § 2903(a).
62. See Barr, supra, note 23, at 534.
63. The legislative history indicates that regulators were concerned with banks failing to
meet the credit needs of different communities, including low- and moderate-income communities,
minority communities, urban and inner city areas, older communities, and rural and small towns.
See MARSICO, supra note 51, at 13 (citations omitted).
64. See 123 CONG. REC. 17,630 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
65. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a). For an argument for revising the CRA to include provisions taking
into account race explicitly, see Stella J. Adams, Putting Race Explicitly into the CRA, in
REVISITING THE CRA: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
167 (Prabal Chakrabarti et al., eds., Fed. Reserve Banks of Boston & S.F. 2009), available at
http://www.frbst org/publications/community/cra/revisiting_cra.pdf
66. See MARSICO, supra note 51, at 11.
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the need for credit services as well as deposit services; and (3)
regulated financial institutions have continuing and affirmative
obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in
which they are chartered.
(b) It is the purpose of this chapter to require each appropriate Federal
financial supervisory agency to use its authority when examining
financial institutions, to encourage such institutions to help meet the
credit needs of the local communities in which they•• are
• chartered
67
consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institutions.
The heart of the CRA is the language, found in § 2901(b), that the federal
bank regulators are to use their authority "to encourage [financial] institutions
to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are
chartered," but this goal
is to ,,68
be carried out "consistent with the safe and sound
... ..
•
operation of such institutions.
The CRA as originally enacted had twin purposes: to defeat redlining (the
practice of excluding certain neighborhoods from capital investment by banks)
and to defeat capital export (the practice of receiving deposits from a
community and investing those funds in other communities). Senator William
Proxmire, one of the sponsors of the CRA, 69 described these practices as
follows:
[B]anks and savings and loans will take their deposits from a
community and instead of reinvesting them in that community, they
will invest them elsewhere, and they will actually or figuratively draw a
red line on a map around the areas of their city, sometimes in the inner
city, sometimes in the older neighborhoods, sometimes ethnic and
sometimes black, but often encompassing a great area of their
neighborhood.70
In a statement of remarkable prescience, Senator Proxmire also highlighted
the need for loans in low-income communities and other communities
underserved by banks. He juxtaposed that need against the practice of banks
engaging in risky lending practices and decried those banks that, instead of
serving the communities that provided their deposits, made "speculative loans"

67. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)-(b).
68. Id.§ 2901(b) (emphasis added).
69. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Exporting the Ownership Society: A Case Study on the
Economic Impact of Property Rights, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 59, 82 n. 116 (2007).
70. 123 CONG. REC. 17,630 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
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to risky ventures, including the predecessors of today's securitized mortgages:
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). 7'
The legislative history of the CRA also makes clear that Congress was
hesitant to impose strict lending requirements on regulated institutions for fear
that such requirements would amount to forced "credit allocation"government dictating how banks should invest their funds based on quotas or
other factors. 2 Several Senators rose in opposition to the CRA, arguing that its
terms would require banks to meet lending quotas within certain communities
and such requirements would lead to risky loans.73 On passing the CRA, the
Senate Report supporting the bill made clear that the CRA, which explicitly
emphasized safe and sound banking practices, did not require specific lending
quotas; instead, the Report noted the duty banks owe to the communities in
which they are chartered: "Charters have never constituted licenses to ignore
local credit needs. Therefore, the Committee rejects the assertion that this Title
allocates credit. It simply underscores the long-standing
obligation to an
74
institution's local service area implicit in existing law."
Moreover, legislators believed that because covered banks received benefits
from both the federal government and the communities from which they
received their deposits, these benefits justified the passage of the CRA. 75 In fact,
the legislators saw the CRA as an explicit quid pro quo with banks for the
benefits banks received from the federal government, including federal charters
(that granted certain exclusive rights to banks), low interest loans, and federal
deposit insurance. 76 Going further, the Senate Report on the CRA highlighted
the link between meeting credit needs and lending in the same community from
which a bank receives deposits, stating that a bank that received deposits from a

71. Id.
72. See id.at17,630-31.
73. See, e.g.,
Community Credit Needs: Hearingon S 406 Before the S.Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 153 (1977) (statement of Sen. John Tower) ("This
proposal would .. provide for a scheme of credit allocation in our financial institutions."); 123
CONG. REC. 17,628 (1977) (statement of Sen. Morgan) ("Ifeel legislation of this nature is a
significant step in the direction of credit allocation by the Congress of the United States."); id.at
17,633 (statement of Sen. Lugar) (describing the CRA as an "attempt to provide credit
allocation"); id.at 17,636 (statement of Sen. Schmitt) ("[T]he [CRA] is a step in the direction of
credit allocation by Government agencies.").
74. S.REP. No. 95-175, at35 (1977).
75. See 123 CONG. REC. 1,958 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
76. See id.For a discussion of the link between these benefits and the CRA, see Barr, supra
note 23, at616-24 (citations omitted); Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After
Fifteen Years: It Works, but Strengthened FederalEnforcement Is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
293, 293 (1993) (citing JONATHAN BROWN, ESSENTIAL INFORMATION/BANKING RESEARCH
PROJECT, COMMUNITY BENEFIT REQUIREMENTS FOR BANKING INSTITUTIONS: THE U.S.
EXPERIENCE 1 (1991)).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60:617

particular community yet lent 99% of those funds outside of that community
would not be "serving community convenience and needs. 77
The link between the application of the CRA and the federal benefits banks
enjoy is most apparent from the types of banking entities that the CRA covers.
According to the statute, the Act only covers "regulated financial institutions, 78
which the statute describes as an "insured depository institution." 79 A wide
range of nondepository institutions, such as mortgage lenders that do not receive
deposits, are thus not covered by the Act. As the discussion in Part JV.A. makes
clear, because a large percentage of subprime lending was conducted by
nondepository institutions, such lending remained beyond the scope of CRA
review. While covered banks are permitted to include the activities of nonbank
affiliates in
their CRA examinations, the banks may do so at their own
80
discretion.
The concept of a bank's assessment area demonstrates the link between the
CRA's goals and the relationship banks should have with the communities
where they have branches and receive deposits. The record of banks covered by
the CRA are reviewed based on the banks' activities within their assessment
areas. 81 The banks determine these assessment areas themselves, but the
regulators review the areas for consistency with the purposes of the CRA. 82 For
most banks, 83 the assessment area or areas delineated must

77. S. REP. NO. 95-175, at 34.
78. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1) (2006).
79. Id. § 2902(2). The CRA explicitly adopts the definition of "insured depository
institution" set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1813, which provides that such an institution is "any bank or
savings association the deposits of which are insured by the [Federal Deposit Insurance]
Corporation." Id. § 1813(c)(2) (2006).
80. 12 C.F.R. § 25.22(c)(1) (2008). For a discussion ofthis option, see Richard D. Marsico,
Subprime Lending, Predatory Lending, and the Community Reinvestment Act Obligations of
Banks, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 735, 738-39 (2003) (citing 12 CF.R. § 25.22(a)(1), (c)(1)).
81. 12 C.F.R. § 25.21(b) (2008).
82. 12 C.F.R. § 25.41(a) (2008). Under the regulations in effect prior to the changes from
the mid-1990s, the delineation of a bank's assessment area was a separate criterion for determining
a bank's CRA record. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156, 22,170-71
(May 4, 1995) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 203, 228, 345, 563e). Under the new regulations, as
described above, the regulators now review the assessment area delineation simply for its
consistency with the purposes ofthe CRA, but it is not a separate criterion on which a bank's CRA
performance is based. 12 C.F.R. § 25.41(a).
83. The definition of assessment areas for wholesale or limited purpose banks
must consist generally of one or more MSAs... (using the MSA... boundaries that
were in effect as of January 1 ofthe calendar year in which the delineation is made) or
one or more contiguous political subdivisions, such as counties, cities, or towns, in
which the bank has its main office, branches, and deposit-taking ATMs.
12 C.F.R. § 25.41(b).
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(1) Consist generally of one or more [Metropolitan Statistical Areas, or
MSAs] (using the MSA... boundaries that were in effect as of January
1 of the calendar year in which the delineation is made) or one or more
contiguous political subdivisions, such as counties, cities, or towns; and
(2) Include the geographies in which the bank has its main office, its
branches, and its deposit-taking ATMs, as well as the surrounding
geographies in which the bank has originated or purchased a substantial
portion of its loans (including home mortgage loans, small business and
small farm loans, and any other loans the bank chooses, such as those
consumer loans on which the bank elects to have its performance
assessed).84
The two critical elements then are (1) the geographic location of its main
office, branches, and deposit-taking ATMs and (2) where a substantial portion
of its loans are purchased or originated. Thus, the community or communities
the bank is supposed to serve under the CRA include the areas where the bank
is physically located and receives deposits, as well as where a substantial
amount of the bank's lending occurs. The CRA, therefore, does not require
banks to meet the needs of communities where the banks are not physically
located or where only a small percentage of loans are originated or purchased.
As also discussed in Part IV.A, the narrow focus of the CRA to only those areas
where a bank is physically present or where a bank does much of its lending,
consistent with the twin purposes of the CRA, 85 leaves a large gap in CRA
coverage, permitting banks free rein to engage in lending and other banking
activities in many communities despite those activities' potential inconsistency
with the needs of those communities.
The CRA charges four federal regulating agencies to apply the Act's
requirements to the banks the agencies supervise.86 The "stick" that is supposed
to help carry out the CRA's goal is that the regulators must take into account the
regulated institution's record of meeting the credit needs of their communities
whenever the institution wishes to engage in a range of activities (mostly having

84. Id. § 25.41(c).
85. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
86. The CRA charges the following federal banking agencies to apply the Act's provisions
to the banks the agencies supervise: the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency applies the law
with respect to national banks; "the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System with
respect to State chartered banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System and bank
holding companies;" the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation "with respect to State chartered
banks and savings banks which are not members of the Federal Reserve System and the deposits of
which are insured by the Corporation"; and the Office of Thrift Supervision with respect to savings
association, "the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation" and
savings and loan holding companies. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(1) (2006).
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to do with expansion) such as a merger with or acquisition of another financial
institution. Here, too, we see the connection between deposit insurance and the
scope of the CRA. The language of the CRA requires regulators to take into
account a covered bank's CRA record whenever the bank applies to its regulator
for a "deposit facility,"8 7 which the statute defines to include an application for
any of the following: "a charter for a national bank or Federal savings and loan
association; ... deposit insurance in connection with a newly chartered...
bank"; the establishment of a branch or other facility that will accept deposits;
the relocation of a home or branch office; or the merger, consolidation,8 8or
acquisition of another regulated financial institution in certain circumstances.
During the examination process, regulators periodically review bank
activities covered by the CRA. In 1995, changes to the regulations
implementing the CRA established a new approach to CRA examinations. Prior
to these changes, regulators focused on twelve factors which often used a
process oriented analysis of banking practices rather than an objective
assessment of the lending activities of banks in low- and moderate-income
communities.8 9 Regulators now evaluate large retail banks 90 under a three-part9 1
review, which includes a lending test, an investment test, and a service test.
Wholesale and limited purpose banks are evaluated according to a community
development test, which looks at a bank's "community development lending,
qualified investments, or community development services." 9 "Intermediate

87. Id.§ 2903(a)(2).
88. Id.§ 2902(3).
89. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156, 22,157 (May 4, 1995)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 203, 228, 345, 563e). The regulations covering the activities ofthe
different regulating agencies are codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 25 for the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, 12 C.F.R. pt. 228 for the Federal Reserve, 12 C.F.R. pt. 345 for the FDIC, and 12
C.F.R. pt. 563e for the Office of Thrift Supervision. 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156. Because the regulations
are virtually identical, for simplicity's sake I shall only refer to those regulations found under 12
C.F.R. pt. 25.
90. Retail banks with more than $1.061 billion in assets are considered large banks. See 12
C.F.R. § 25.12(u)(1).
91. Id.§ 25.21(a)(1). The lending testincludes an analysis of a bank's performance in
"home mortgage, small business, small farm, and community development lending." Id.
§ 25.22(a)(1). The investment testincludes an analysis of the dollar amounts of a bank's
investments, the bank's innovativeness, its
responsiveness to community needs, and whether such
investments meet needs other banks do not routinely meet. Id.§ 25.23(c). The service test
includes
a review of the "availability and effectiveness of a bank's systems for delivering retail banking
services and the extent and innovativeness of its
community development services." Id.§25.24(a).
All ofthese tests
are carried out in light of a given bank's "performance context," which includes,
inter alia, a review of market factors, the bank's capacity, itspast performance, and the
performance of other "similarly situated" lenders. Id.§ 25.21(b). For a discussion of these tests,
see MARSICO, supra note 51, at78-81; Barr, supra note 23, at525.
92. 12 C.F.R. § 25.25(a).
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small banks," with assets between $250 million and $1.061 billion, 93 are
reviewed under a community development test that takes into account bank
94
loans, investments, and services to low- and moderate-income customers.
Small retail banks 95 must meet a lending test, which takes into account, among
other things, loan-to-deposit ratios, a bank's record of lending to low income
borrowers,
and the percentage of loans made in a bank's CRA assessment
96
area. Through these examinations, banks are given one of four "grades," based
on the evaluations conducted, which signifies the bank's relative success in
"meeting community credit needs": "outstanding," "satisfactory," "needs to
improve," or "substantial noncompliance." 97 These grades do not have any
impact at the time they are given, but the regulators take them into account
when reviewing
a particular bank's record in the context of a CRA-covered
98
transaction.
Individuals and community groups can request these review records99 and
may comment on a particular bank's CRA activities. 100 More importantly,
citizens and community groups can file CRA "challenges" or "protests" at the
time a bank applies to its regulators to consummate a transaction the approval of
which requires CRA consideration.' 0' The regulators rule on these challenges,
and as described below, such decisions historically have been immune from
judicial review. Richard Marsico describes the CRA challenge process as
follows:
A bank submits its expansion application to the federal banking agency
that regulates it. At approximately the same time, the bank publishes a
notice in its local newspaper announcing the application and the
opportunity for public comment. Notices are also published in agency
bulletins and websites. The notice includes a deadline for filing
comments. A community group that believes the bank has a poor
record of meeting the credit needs of the community contacts the bank
to express its concerns about the bank's CRA record and its plans for
the future. The community group makes a proposal for the bank to

93.
94.
95.
assets. Id.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. § 25.12(u)(1).
Id. § 25.26(c).
The regulations define small banks as institutions having less than $1.061 billion in
§ 25.12(u)(1).
Id. § 25.26(b).
12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2) (2006).
Id. § 2903(a)(2).
12 C.F.R. § 25.43(a)(2).

100. Id.§ 25.43(a)(1).
101. See Richard D. Marsico, The New Community Reinvestment Act Regulations: An
Attempt at Implementing Performance-Based Standards, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 47, 48
(1995).
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agree to increase its lending in [low- and moderate-income] and
minority neighborhoods. The bank and the community group negotiate
over the proposal. As the deadline for filing a challenge to the merger
approaches, the pressure on the bank to forestall the challenge grows,
and the parties may reach a lending agreement. If not, the community
group may file a challenge, but the negotiations might continue while
the challenge is pending. While the challenge is pending, the federal
banking agency considering the application might conduct a private
meeting with the parties or conduct a public hearing. If the community
group and bank did not reach a lending agreement before the challenge
was filed, they could reach an agreement after it was filed but before
the agency issues a decision. 102
Marsico has identified four factors that motivate banks to take their CRA
records and the community group challenges to their applications seriously. 103
First, although this is extremely rare, banks fear that the regulators will deny
their application. Second, a delay of a bank merger application can ultimately
result in the failure of the merger. Third, a challenge can be costly to fight in
terms of legal fees and other costs. Fourth, the bad publicity a bank receives
from a challenge or from a poor CRA rating can harm customer relations, drive
potential customers away, and send stock values down.
Many have criticized the CRA since its inception. Conservative critiques
include the argument that the CRA is unnecessary because there is little
evidence of discrimination in the home mortgage market to justify imposing the
CRA's burdens on banks. 104 Others claim that the CRA is an inefficient means
to combat any discrimination that might be present in credit markets. 105
Furthermore, some commentators argue that the CRA's goal of encouraging
banks to meet the credit needs of low- and moderate-income communities
contradicts the CRA requirement that any lending in those communities must

102. MARSICO, supra note 51, at 134 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 133.
104. See, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris et al., Housing-Finance Intervention and Private
Incentives: Helping Minorities and the Poor, 26 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 634, 634 (1994)
(arguing with empirical data that there is a lack of evidence of discrimination in the mortgage
market); Jeffrey M. Lacker, Neighborhoods and Banking, ECON. Q., Spring 1995, at 13, 13-14
(same).
105. See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A MarketOriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1580 (1995)
(arguing that CRA is an inefficient response to lending discrimination); Jeffery W. Gunther,
Should CRA Stand for "Community Redundancy Act"?, REG., Fall 2000, at 56, 56, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv23n3/gunther.pdf (arguing with empirical data that CRA
is unnecessary to broaden access to credit markets by minorities).
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also be consistent with safe and sound lending practices. 10 6 In other words,
requiring that banks make loans with arguably greater risk is inherently
inconsistent with bank safety and soundness.
From the left, commentators have echoed some of these critiques, albeit
from a different perspective, arguing that the loose standards under the law and
regulations are unenforceable and that regulators consistently fail to carry out
the spirit of the law. Some question the ability of the CRA to improve lending in
underserved markets because the Act does not mandate loans in particular
neighborhoods. 0 7 Others argue that the CRA's vague language and regulators'
hands off approach have led to weak enforcement of the CRA's goals.108 Still
others argue that the CRA's underlying premise-that banks should be
encouraged to bring their products to underserved communities-ratifies
corporate elites'
vision of equality while undermining community
09
empowerment.
Proponents for reform of the CRA have suggested that the CRA should
move to a system of tradeable obligations," 0 similar to the approach used in
some environmental contexts. Another scholar suggests a performance-based
approach-"safe harbor" provisions that would shield from CRA challenges
banks with a demonstrated track record of meeting CRA obligations.I'
Professor Michael Barr has defended the CRA from these attacks, arguing
that the CRA's standards-based approach-one that allows regulators to take
into account a particular bank's market, community, and business strategy-is

106. See, e.g.,
Calomiris etal., supra note 104, at654 (suggesting that "CRA compliance
involves making unprofitable loans"); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community
Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 295 (1993) (arguing that the CRA
"encourages banks to make unprofitable and risky investment and product-line decisions").
107. See, e.g.,Craig E. Marcus, Note, Beyond the Boundaries of the Community
Reinvestment Act and the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a Market-Based Framework for
Generating Low- and Moderate-Income Lending, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 710 (1996) ("[A]n
alternative to the CRA [must require] banks to become responsible for ensuring that they originate
a sufficient level of profitable loans in their surrounding low- and moderate-income
communities.").
108. See, e.g.,
MARSICO, supra note 51, at89-130 ("[T]he federal banking agencies have
continued to enforce the CRA in a way that undermines the CRA's potential for democratizing
capital." (citations omitted)).
109. See, e.g.,Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic
Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial
Justice, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1467-69 (1994) (arguing that programs like the CRA "turn[] the
aspirations of disempowered groups into mere special interest pleadings (citing 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2901-2906 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (current version at12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (2006)))).
110. See, e.g.,
Klausner, supra note 105, at 1586-88 ("in contrast to the current CRA
regime, a system of tradable obligations would promote specialization.").
111. See Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the Community
Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 349, 349-50 (1993).
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the correct approach for spurring investment without dictating how banks
should allocate resources.
As a result, he argues, the CRA as currently
conceptualized is best structured to promote the goals of the CRA in the most
efficient and effective way possible:
Different firms have different cost structures, scope and scale, and
operate in markets with different demographics and competitive
structures. Firms make loans at different times under different market
conditions. Setting a single rate (or rates) of lending in advance would
likely cause some firms to be unable to meet the standard despite their
best efforts, cause others to make uneconomic loans, and cause still
others to meet the rule without any serious effort to lend to low-income
borrowers. Moreover, such a rule would become stale over time, and
would not easily be adapted to changing market conditions.
By contrast, the CRA standards permit banks to respond to local
needs based on their own institutional organization, market
assessments, and business plans, without being judged on the basis of
national norms. Rather, examiners look to local context and business
strategy. The flexibility provided by the performance context
assessment is one of the most critical aspects of the CRA regulation. It
permits the locally based decisionmaking contemplated by Congress in
enacting CRA. Standards also diminish the extent to which regulators
need fear that CRA would lead to "credit allocation," since the bank
makes the judgment about whether, and to whom, to extend a loan. The
CRA standard can evolve with changes in the market at relatively low
cost. II
Numerous studies conducted over the last ten years provide tangible
evidence that the CRA has worked effectively to bring credit to communities
that banks and other financial institutions previously underserved. 4 A two-part

112. See Barr, supra note 23, at 600.
113. Id. (footnote call numbers omitted). Barr also argues that the standards-based approach
with provisions for community input permits banks and the community to engage in a process that
increases the "accuracy and legitimacy" of bank efforts to meet community needs. Id. at 601.
Furthermore, the use of standards "conveys social meaning and affects enforcement," and in this
way "the law helps create social norms, reveals instances in which actors transgress those norms,
and contributes to compliance even absent legal consequences." Id. at 603.
114. See, e.g., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV., THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN AN EVOLVING FINANCIAL
SERVICES
SYSTEM
iv (2002), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/

governmentprograms/cra02-I.pdf (reviewing home mortgage data from the 1990s and showing
increased lending to minority and low-income borrowers); Barr, supra note 23, at 563, 565
(calculating lending data from 1993 to 1999 and showing increased home mortgage lending to
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study commissioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and carried out by
the Brookings Institution and the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard
University revealed that the CRA was likely responsible for "nearly $620
billion in home mortgage, small business, and community development loans to
low- and moderate-income borrowers and communities." 115 Another study
conducted by the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University looked
at the performance of CRA-covered banks acting within their CRA assessment
areas, CRA-covered banks acting outside of their CRA assessment areas, and
financial institutions beyond the reach of the CRA. 116The study found that
prime mortgage lending carried out in minority communities was the strongest
when carried out by banks acting within their CRA assessment areas.117
Looking specifically at the impact of the CRA on home mortgage lending, one
study posited that the 1995 changes to the CRA regulations and the resulting
stronger CRA enforcement may have led to a reduction in the homeownership
rate gap between blacks and whites between 1995 and 1997.118
Looking at the CRA agreements-deals struck between community groups
and financial institutions to resolve CRA challenges-the impact of the CRA is
even more profound. The National Community Reinvestment Coalition tracks
the results of agreements reached through CRA challenges and has concluded
that from the inception of the CRA until early 2008, the CRA challenge process
has resulted in banks making commitments to lend approximately $6 trillion in

minorities during this period); Douglas D. Evanoff & Lewis M. Segal, CRA and Fair Lending
Regulations: Resulting Trends in Mortgage Lending, ECON. PERSP., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at19, 38,
available at http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economicperspectives/1996/epnd96b.pdf
(showing the CRA and fair lending enforcement increased lending to minority communities);
Michael LaCour-Little, Does the Community Reinvestment Act Make Mortgage Credit More
Widely Available'? Some New Evidence Based on the Performance of CRA Mortgage Credits 14,
21 (May 4, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (showing evidence from case study
that lenders improved lending to minority communities due to the CRA).
115. Barr, supra note 23, at 566 (citing ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AFTER FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION: A
BASELINE REPORT, at ES-5, ES-14, ES-16 (2000), available at http://www.novoco.com/

low income housing/resource files/researchcenter/crareport.pdf). The authors of the Baseline
Report admitted that a host of factors may have led to the increased lending identified in their
study, including growth in the economy, enforcement of fair lending laws, and changes in the
HMDA reporting requirements. LITAN ET AL., supra, atES-1 1. See also ERIC S. BELSKY ET AL.,
THE EFFECT OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT ON BANK AND THRIFT HOME PURCHASE

MORTGAGE LENDING 1 (2001), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/
governmentprograms/belschillyezer cra0l-1.pdf (discussing other studies with results similar to
those of the Baseline Report).
116. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, supra note 114, at48, 53 exhibit 19.
117. Id.
118. Lewis M. Segal & Daniel G. Sullivan, Trends in Homeownership: Race,
Demographics,and Income, ECON. PERSP., 2d Quarter 2008, at53, 68.
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low- and moderate-income communities. 119 Several studies have assessed the
impact of CRA agreements, and all have found that the presence of a CRA
agreement tyically results in improved lending to low- and moderate-income
communities.
One might be tempted to argue that this increase in lending was precisely
the product of these agreements-obtained through undue pressure on banks
facing trial in the court of public opinion-which led to risky loans and the
subprime crisis. But lending programs that flow from CRA agreements are
typically programs that the CRA ultimately covers-the programs involve
lending that assists low- and moderate-income communities, the loans are made
within banks' CRA assessment areas, and regulators review the programs in the
CRA examination process of those banks. 121 All of these features are
inconsistent with the overwhelming
majority of risky subprime lending carried
122
decade.
this
of
middle
the
in
out
Moreover, history and research show that CRA lending programs are
generally profitable and comparable in risk to most depository institutions'
other lending portfolios. 124 More recent research carried out by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System studying the performance of CRArelated lending in 2005-2006 compared to other types of lending during that
period-including higher priced subprime lending-showed that borrowers
connected to CRA-related loans were half as likely to be delinquent on their

119.

NAT'L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., CRA TOOLKIT: PROTECTING AND PRESERVING

THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 2 (2008), available at http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/
era/cra toolkit v8 remarks joint statement.pdf.
120. See, e.g., RAPHAEL W. BOSTIC & BRECK L. ROBINSON, WHAT MAKES CRA
AGREEMENTS WORK? A STUDY OF LENDER RESPONSES TO CRA AGREEMENTS 14, 26 tbl.2

(2003), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2003_conf paper session5 bostic.pdf
(showing increased lending activities in low- and moderate-income communities during periods
agreements were in effect); GREGORY D. SQUIRES & SALLY O'CONNOR, COLOR AND MONEY:
POLITICS AND PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT IN URBAN AMERICA 166 (2001)

(finding increased lending to minority and low- and moderate-income communities by banks
entering into CRA agreements compared to those without such agreements); Alex Schwartz, Bank
Lending to Minority and Low-Income Households and Neighborhoods: Do Community
Reinvestment Agreements" Make a Difference?, 20 J. URB. AFF. 269, 280-82 & tbl.5 (1998)
(finding a higher percentage of conventional home mortgage lending to black borrowers among
banks with CRA agreements compared to banks without such agreements).
121. For an overview of the terms of CRA lending agreements, see generally NAT'L CMTY.
REINVESTMENT
COAL.,
CRA
COMMITMENTS
(2007),
available
at
http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/whatWeDopromote/cra commitments_07.pdf
122. For a discussion of the scope of the CRA with respect to subprime loans, see
discussion infra Part V.A.
123. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
PROFITABILITY
OF
CRA-RELATED
LENDING

RESERVE SYS., THE PERFORMANCE AND
45
(2000),
available at http:/www.

federalreserve. gov/boarddocs/surveys/craloansurvey/cratext.pdf
124. Id. at48.
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mortgage payments as subprime borrowers. 2 5 And measuring foreclosures in
the second quarter of 2008, subprime borrowers were twenty times more likely
to end up in foreclosure than borrowers in a CRA-related program. 126
The Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages. DisaggregatingEffects Using
Propensity Score Models study (Risky Borrowers study), generated by the
Center for Community Capital at the University of North Carolina, compared
the performance of subprime loans with the performance of loans made through
the Community Advantage Program (CAP), a CRA-related lending program
developed by the North Carolina fair lending organization Self-Help. 127
Through CAP, lenders made loans on prime terms to borrowers with credit
profiles that matched those of borrowers typically found in the subprime
market. 128 Because the profiles of the borrowers were the same in the CAP
market as in the subprime market, the study could compare the loan
performance of the borrowers in the CAP program to the performance of
borrowers receiving subprime loans. 129 The study even measured the
performance of CAP borrowers against borrowers with subprime loans,
controlling for different features typically found in the subprime market such as
adjustable-rate mortgages, prepayment penalties, and broker-originated loans. 130
The researchers were able to address a question often posed about the causes of
the subprime meltdown: Was it risky borrowers that caused the crisis or risky
loan terms? The results, set forth below, show that the fault may have been the
latter: risky loans.
The Risky Borrowers study compared loan performance of one group of
loans-originated in the subprime markets and through the CAP program in
2003-2004-and a second similar group originated in 2005-2006. For loans
originated during the first time period, subprime loans had a cumulative default

125. Memorandum from Glenn Canner & Neil Bhutta, Div. of Research and Statistics, Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., to Sandra Braunstein, Dir., Consumer & Cmty. Affairs
Div., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 10 tbl.7 (Nov. 21, 2008), available at
http://www. federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/20081203_analysis.pdf
126. Id.
127. Lei Ding et al., Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages: Disaggregating Effects Using
Propensity Score Models 7 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished working paper, available at
http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/RiskyMortg_FinalDeci 1.pdt).
128. The borrowers had identical characteristics in terms of the lien status of the loans, the
amortization period of the loans, the loans' purpose, occupancy status of the borrowers,
documentation supplied, time period of origination, and geographic area. Id. at 8. The samples
differed slightly in terms of debt-to-income ratio (DTI), loan-to-value ratio (LTV), credit score,
loan amount, and other loan features. Id. The credit scores of the CAP participants were slightly
higher than the scores ofthe subprime borrowers in the study. See id. at 25 fig.2.
129. See id. at 8.
130. See id.
131. See id. at l6.
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rate of 16.3%, approximately four times the CAP program's default rate of
4.1%. 132 During the second time period, the cumulative default rate for the
subprime loans was 47.0%- over 3.5 times the rate for comparable CAP loans
(13.3%).l33 Taking into account specific subprime features, including adjustable
rates, broker originations, and prepayment penalties, the subprime loans in the
first time period defaulted at a rate of 21.8%, compared to 4.10% for CAP loans;
in the second time period, the subprime
loans defaulted at a rate of 53.8%,
134
loans.
CAP
the
for
13.3%
to
compared
While the CRA has unquestionably led
to an increase in beneficial lending
• , 135
in low- and moderate-income communities,
risky subprime lending in many
of these same communities has helped to spur the subprime mortgage crisis and
the wider financial crisis that has followed. 136 The next sections take up the
questions posed earlier: Did the CRA cause these crises, and why did the CRA
not prevent them?
IV. THE CRA AND SUBPRIME LENDING: REGULATIONS, REGULATORS, AND THE
COURTS

A.

The Scope ofthe CRA

Simply put, the CRA, as enforced by the regulators, did not cause the
subprime mortgage crisis, nor could the CRA have prevented the crisis, given
the law's current incarnation and the way the regulators have interpreted and
enforced the Act. The overwhelming majority of subprime lending in minority
communities took place outside the scope of the CRA137-the CRA did not in
any way pressure subprime lenders to make the loans that they did. The CRA
simply does not cover most subprime lending. At the outset, it is important to
note that nearly two-thirds of all mortgages are beyond the scope of the CRA
because nondepository institutions originate these mortgages. 38 Looking deeper

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 17.
135. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury
Department Releases CRA Study (Apr. 19, 2000), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/ls564.htm.
136. See, e.g., Ding et al., supra note 127, at 2 (noting that the rapid rise in subprime
mortgage delinquency and foreclosure has caused the subprime mortgage meltdown).
137. See Canner & Bhutta, supra note 125, at 3.
138. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the
Community Affairs Research Conference, Washington, D.C.: The Community Reinvestment Act:
Its Evolution and New Challenges (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bernanke20070330a.htm; see also LITAN ET AL., supra note 115, at 19, 102
chart 14 (analyzing HMDA data from 1993 through 1998 and finding that two-thirds of the
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into subprime lending reveals there are several other reasons why most
subprime lending took place outside of the CRA's protections. Indeed, the
overwhelming majority of subprime lending was generally well beyond the
scope of the CRA, and the information collected over the last five years on
subprime mortgage originations establishes just that.
A study analyzing data compiled before the height of the subprime
mortgage market revealed that the CRA covered only 3% of first lien home
loans and 4% of refinance loans analyzed. 139 A more recent assessment
conducted by the Federal Reserve, reviewing loans made in 2005-2006 (the
height of the subprime market), determined that the CRA covered only 6% of

increase in subprime lending to low- and moderate-income communities during this period was
from subprime lenders not covered by the CRA whereas only 15% of these loans were originated
by CRA-covered institutions). Recent speeches by regulators and even one banking industry
representative echo former Chairman Bernanke's defense of the CRA. See, e.g., Sheila C. Bair,
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks Before the Consumer Federation of America 1 (Dec.
4, 2008), available at http://www.naahl.org/portals/ 11/fdic-bair defends cra.pdf (arguing that the
CRA is not to blame for the financial crisis because instead of forcing FDIC-insured banks into
business with borrowers who cannot repay it encourages the banks to lend to low- and moderateincome areas so long as the loans are consistent with the safe and sound operation of such
institutions); John C. Dugan, Comptroller ofthe Currency, Remarks Before the Enterprise Annual
Network Conference 4 (Nov. 19, 2008), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008136a.pdf (arguing that the CRA, while not perfect, has made nothing but positive contributions to
community revitalization across the country, encouraging "sound community development
lending, investment, and service initiatives by regulated banking organizations"); Randall S.
Kroszner, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the Confronting
Concentrated Poverty Policy Forum: The Community Reinvestment Act and the Recent Mortgage
Crisis (Dec. 3, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
kroszner20081203a.htm (arguing that there is a lack of empirical evidence to support claims
blaming the CRA for the financial crisis because during implementation ofthe law over the past
thirty years, the CRA has not been shown to contribute to the erosion of safe and sound lending
practices, and that in fact, it is an important model for designing incentives that motivate private
sector involvement to help meet community financial needs); Kenneth D. Lewis, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, Bank of Am., Remarks to the Executives' Club of Chicago: Banking on
Main Street (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/index.php?sspeeches&item-213 (arguing that the CRA is not to blame for the financial crisis because the
riskiest subprime lending of the past ten years was unrelated to the CRA, as "75% of high-priced
loans made by mortgage companies and bank affiliates in recent years were not covered by CRA,"
and that the only reason CRA loan portfolios are under stress right now is because "[1]ow-tomoderate income families and neighborhoods are economically vulnerable and are always the first
and hardest hit in an economic downturn").
139. William C. Apgar & Mark Duda, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Community
Reinvestment Act: Past Accomplishments and Future Regulatory Challenges, 9 FED. RES. BANK
N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV., June 2003, at 169, 180-81 (noting that in 2000, only 3% of subprime

loans were made by CRA-covered institutions in their assessment areas, and 96% of subprime
refinance loans were made by independent mortgage companies and covered institutions lending
out oftheir CRA assessment areas).
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all higher priced loans (the Federal Reserve's proxy for subprime loans). 140
Therefore, fully 94% of all home mortgage and refinance loans made during
this two-year period were beyond the scope of the CRA altogether.
Furthermore, less than 2% of all subprime loans originated by 42independent
banking entities were then purchased by CRA-covered institutions.
This phenomenon has occurred for several reasons. First, the CRA does not
cover
subprime
lenders because they are not federally regulated depository
•. most
.
143
institutions.
Also, federally regulated banks that the CRA covers may engage
in subprime lending outside their CRA assessment area; when they do this, such
lending is beyond CRA review. 144 In addition, some federally regulated banks
might engage in subprime lending through affiliates and subsidiaries, and, at the
bank's discretion, such activities can be excluded from CRA review (provided
that the subsidiary or affiliate is not itself a covered depository institution). 145
Finally, loans made to borrowers who are not of low or moderate income are
also beyond the reach of the CRA. 146
In sum, rather than causing the subprime mortgage crisis, the CRA was
powerless to stop the crisis precisely because of the way Congress drafted the
Act and regulators enforced it: the CRA only covers certain institutions (it

140. Canner & Bhutta, supra note 125, at3.
141. See id.Itis also important to note that the 6% figure might actually overstate the
number of subprime loans that the CRA covers. The analysts preparing the report did not
differentiate between loans made by CRA-covered institutions and loans made by their affiliates.
Thus, this percentage includes the lending carried out by affiliates of CRA-covered entities. See id.
As stated above, the lending of these affiliated may be placed beyond CRA review at the covered
institution's discretion. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
142. Canner & Bhutta, supra note 125, at4. The Federal Reserve's analysis also attempted
to inquire whether this small percentage of CRA-covered loans performed better or worse than
other subprime loans in order to determine whether there was any disproportionate impact from the
CRA on foreclosures. They found that loan performance across different types of loans, whether
covered by the CRA or not, was comparable. Id.at 4-6. Indeed, looking atone type of CRAcovered loan (loans generated by the NeighborWorks campaign), the Federal Reserve analysis
found that these loans performed, on average, significantly better than subprime loans generally
(with 9% resulting in delinquency, compared to 18% for subprime loans) and led to far fewer
foreclosures (a 0.21 % foreclosure rate, compared to a 4.26% foreclosure rate for subprime loans).
Id. at10 tbl.7.
143. Many subprime lenders are "nondepository institutions" and thus are exempt from the
CRA. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(c)(2), 2902(1) (2006). For an overview of the different regulatory
structures for depository and nondepository institutions, see PATRICIA A. MCCOY & ELIZABETH
RENUART,

THE

LEGAL

INFRASTRUCTURE

OF

SUBPRIME

AND

NONTRADITIONAL

HOME

MORTGAGES 19-23 (2008) (citations omitted), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/
publications/finance/understandingconsumer credit/papers/uccO8-5 mccoy renuart.pdif.
144. Cf 12 C.F.R. § 25.41(a) (2008) (describing how a regulated entity's assessment area is
established for the purpose of CRA review). For a critique ofthe limitations of using an assessment
area approach to CRA review, see Marsico, supra note 80, at177-78.
145. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 23, at1588-89; MARISCO, supra note 51, at747.
146. See Kroszner, supra note 138.
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excludes nondepository institutions, which predominated in the subprime
lending market); the Act only monitors the conduct of covered banks in their
self-identified assessment areas; and subsidiaries of covered banks (those
affiliated entities that often engaged in subprime lending) are often left out of
the CRA assessment process at the banks' choice. Indeed, because of these
loopholes, only 6% of subprime loans originated in 2005-2006 were within the
CRA's purview. 147
B. Efforts to Change the Regulations and Broaden the CRA 's Scope
The first overhaul of the CRA's regulations ushered in the current approach
to CRA examinations. 4 8 When the regulators amended the CRA regulations,
they declared that they would review those regulations in 2002.149 The review
process began in July 2001 when the federal banking agencies charged with0
enforcing the CRA issued a Joint Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.15
The process took over four years, and a complete analysis of the various
proposals that unfolded during that process is beyond the scope of this
Article. 151 For purposes of this discussion, I will focus on two critical issues that
came up during the course of the regulators' review of the CRA regulations:
whether to include nondepository bank affiliates of covered institutions as part
of the CRA examination process, and whether to include the lending of CRAcovered banks that occurs outside of those banks' assessment areas as part of
the examination process. The issues raised-the failure of the CRA to cover
bank affiliates and lending outside the scope of banks' assessment areas-were
key features of the CRA that placed much subprime lending beyond the CRA's
reach.

147. See supra note 141.
148. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
149. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156, 22,177 (May 4,
1995) (codified at12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 203, 228, 345, 563e).
150. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,602 (proposed July 19,
2001) (codified at12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 203, 228, 345, 563e).
151. For a timeline of the review process, see Richard D. Marsico, The 2004 2005
Amendments to the Community Reinvestment Act Regulations: For Communities, One Step
Forwardand Three Steps Back, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 534, 534 n.2 (2006). Marsico describes
the process as "controversial, tortuous, and divisive." Id.at534. According to the agencies, they
received over four hundred comments after issuing the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
and these comments indicated a "profound split over the need for, and appropriate direction of,
change" in the CRA regulations. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 5,729,
5,729 (Feb. 6, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 203, 228, 345, 563e) ("Community
organizations advocated 'updating' the regulations with expanded requirements to match
developments in the industry and marketplace; financial institutions were concerned principally
with reducing burden consistent with maintaining or improving the regulations' effectiveness.").
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CoveringBank Affiliates

As described above, the federal bank regulators do not review the activities
of non-bank lenders who are affiliated with covered institutions during the CRA
examination process unless the covered institution asks for their affiliates'
inclusion in that process. 152 Because these noncovered institutions carried out
much subprime lending, 153 the banks themselves placed a great deal of subpri me
lending beyond the reach of the CRA. During the CRA regulation review
process, advocates asked the regulators to reconsider this loophole and proposed
54
that the CRA examination process include the activities of banks' affiliates.1
While the regulations ultimately adopted by the Federal Reserve, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) did clarify the extent to which these
regulators would take into account evidence of discrimination or other illegal
lending practices when considering a bank's CRA record (a significant victory
for community groups pressing for such changes), in the end, the regulations
still maintained that covered banks had the discretion to include their affiliates'
lending in the CRA examination process. 55 The final regulations even limited

152. See supra text accompanying note 145.
153. See Canner & Bhutta, supra note 125, at 3.
154. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 5,731, 5,739.
155. 12 C.F.R. § 25.22(c)(1) (2008). A representative regulatory provision on the issue of
illegal lending practices, reflecting the 2004-2005 amendments, provides as follows:
(c) Effect of evidence of discriminatory or other illegal credit practices.
(1) The OCC's evaluation of a bank's CRA performance is adversely affected by
evidence of discriminatory or other illegal credit practices in any geography by the
bank or in any assessment area by any affiliate whose loans have been considered
as part of the bank's lending performance. In connection with any type of lending
activity described in § 25.22(a), evidence of discriminatory or other credit practices
that violate an applicable law, rule, or regulation includes, but is not limited to:
(i) Discrimination against applicants on a prohibited basis in violation, for
example, of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act or the Fair Housing Act;
(ii) Violations of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act;
(iii) Violations of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act;
(iv) Violations of section 8 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act: and
(v) Violations of the Truth in Lending Act provisions regarding a consumer's
right of rescission.
(2) In determining the effect of evidence of practices described in paragraph (c)(1)
of this section on the bank's assigned rating, the OCC considers the nature, extent,
and strength of the evidence of the practices; the policies and procedures that the
bank (or affiliate, as applicable) has in place to prevent the practices any
corrective action that the bank (or affiliate, as applicable) has taken or has
committed to take, including voluntary corrective action resulting from selfassessment; and any other relevant information.
Id. § 25.28(c).
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the regulators' ability to take into account documented evidence of illegal
lending practices by affiliates; if a covered bank exercises its discretion to
remove that affiliate's lending from CRA review, the regulators are powerless
to take such illegal practices into account. 156
2.

CoveringLending Outside a Bank's CRA Assessment Area

When reviewing the CRA regulations, the regulators also considered
extending the CRA examination process to cover bank lending that occurred
outside a covered bank's CRA assessment area (those neighborhoods where
banks have branches and take deposits). 157 Not only is the assessment area
conception of the CRA antiquated in the modern era of global and Internet
banking, but it is also an invitation to banks to engage in risky subprime lending
outside their CRA assessment area without subjecting such lending to CRA
review. This is precisely what happened-when banks otherwise covered by the
CRA did engage in subprime lending, they often did so outside of their CRA
assessment areas, so that the CRA examination did not analyze this lending as
part of the bank's regular review. 15 8 Community advocates pushed for a new
approach to bank assessment areas:
Community organizations contended that substantial portions of
lending by institutions covered by CRA are nonetheless not subject to
CRA evaluation because of institutions' increasing use of nonbranch
channels (including agencies, the Internet, and telephone) to provide
credit outside of their branch-based assessment areas ....
[M]any
commenters proposed that an institution's assessment areas include all
areas in which the institution has more than a specified share59(many
suggested 0.5 percent) of the lending market or deposit market.1
Not surprisingly, banks resisted any expansion of the scope of the CRA
examination process beyond banks' traditional CRA-defined assessment areas,
i.e., where the CRA confines the assessment area to the communities in which

156. See id. §§ 22.28(c)(1)-(2), 25.22(c)(1); see also Community Reinvestment Act
Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 5,740 ("[T]he proposed revisions would clarify that an institution's
CRA evaluation also can be adversely affected by evidence of discriminatory, other illegal, and
abusive credit practices by any affiliate, if any loans of that affiliate have been considered in the
CRA evaluation pursuant to [12 C.F.R. 25.22(c)(1)-(2)]." (footnote call number omitted)). In other
words, the regulators only consider the potentially illegal activities of affiliates in the context of a
CRA examination if the bank elects to have the regulators review that affiliate's activities.
157. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 5,731, 5,739.
158. See Brescia, Capital in Chaos, supra note 5, at 286.
159. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 5,735.
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banks take their deposits. 160 Indeed, "[s]ome questioned
whether such an
161
expansion would be consistent with the [CRA itself]."'
In the end, the regulators determined that the current approach of the CRA
with respect to bank assessment areas, though not perfect, was the most
appropriate, given the alternatives. While recognizing that "[n]o definition of
'assessment area' will foresee every conceivable bank or thrift business model,"
and that "limitations in the current definition of 'assessment area' might grow in
significance as the market evolves," such limitations were not "so significant or
pervasive that the current definition is fundamentally ineffective."' From the
regulators' perspective, the alternatives failed to "improve the existing
definition sufficiently to justify the costs of regulatory change."' 163 At the same
time, some of these alternatives "raised fundamental questions about the scope
and purpose of CRA and entail political
judgments that may be better left to
164
elected officials in the first instance."'
C. FederalRegulators, State "Sheriffs, " and PredatoryLending
In addition to resisting efforts to bring lending by bank affiliates and
lending outside of bank CRA assessment areas within the purview of the CRA,
over the last twelve years, two federal regulatory agencies-the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) and the OCC-have taken the lead in attempting to preempt
state banking laws related to predatory lending. Laying the groundwork for this
attack on state laws was the OTS's adoption of regulations pursuant to the
Home Owners' Loan Act 165 (HOLA) that preempted state laws that affected
"the operations of federal savings associations." 66 The OTS adopted these
regulations with the expressed purpose of "enabl[ing] federal savings
associations to conduct their operations in accordance with the best practices of
thrift institutions," 167 and the regulations operated to preempt state laws
affecting OTS-regulated entities with respect to licensing, disclosure
requirements, and interest rates, among other areas.168 By its express terms, the
regulation's intended effect is to "occup[y] the entire field of lending regulation

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 5,735-36.
165. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (2006).
166. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2008).
167. Id.
168. Id. § 560.2(b). The regulation exempts from preemption those state laws that
incidentally affect the operations of OTS-regulated entities and are more traditionally relegated to
state law, such as contract, real property, and criminal law. Id. § 560.2(c).
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for federal savings associations.
In 2003, several years after the issuance of
this regulation, in a series of sweeping actions, the OTS issued a host of letters
declaring that federal laws and regulations preempted state predatory lending
laws in Georgia, 70 New York,' 7' New Jersey, 72 and New Mexico, nullifying
the state laws' effects on OTS-regulated entities.
In January 2004, the OCC issued a series of regulations that preempt state
efforts to curb predatory lending. The first regulation focuses on state laws
addressing mortgage lending of national banks and their subsidiaries,
preempting laws that "obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's ability to
fully exercise its Federally authorized real estate lending powers." 174 This
regulation preempts state laws that relate to the terms of mortgages, escrow
account requirements, insurance requirements, loan-to-value ratios, and a range
of other mortgage-related matters. As a result, this regulation hampers the
ability of the states to curb many predatory lending abuses because predatory
lending practices often arise in these areas.
In a second regulation, the OCC amended its examination powers, declaring
that it has the exclusive powers to visit, examine, and inspect the banks it
regulates.1 6 The regulation goes even further, asserting that the OCC has the
exclusive authority to enforce federal laws and state laws regarding bank
activities authorized• by federal
law or any bank functions carried out pursuant
'77
to federal enabling statutes. In a twist that has created a clear legal vacuum,
subsidiaries of OCC-regulated entities are now exempt from state predatory

169. Id. § 560.2(a); see also Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American
Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
1303, 1339-40 (2006) (citation omitted) (describing 1996 Home Owners' Loan Act amendments
and subsequent preemption letters); Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and PredatoryLending:
Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 96-97 (2005) (describing the
preemption efforts ofthe OTS and OCC as consistent with a deregulatory philosophy).
170. Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-1, Preemption of
Georgia Fair Lending Act (Jan. 21, 2003), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/56301.pdf
171. Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-2, Preemption of
New York Predatory Lending Law (Jan. 30, 2003), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/
56302.pdf
172. Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-5, Preemption of
New Jersey Predatory Lending Act (July 22, 2003), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/
56305.pdf
173. Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-6, Preemption of
New Mexico Home Loan Protection Act (Sept. 2, 2003), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/
56306.pdf. For further discussion of these preemption letters, see Forrester, supra note 169, at
1339-40 (citations omitted).
174. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (2008).
175. Id.
176. Id.§ 7.4000(a).
177. Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1,895, 1,897 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at
12 C.F.R. 7.4000) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1) (2006)).
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lending laws17 8 while also exempt from the CRA (provided the parent bank
chooses to exclude the subsidiary from CRA review). 7 9 This last issue-the
application of federal preemption principles to the activities of the subsidiaries
of federally regulated banks-ultimately reached the United States Supreme
Court, and the Court endorsed the federal regulators' view that even subsidiaries
80
of OCC-regulated banks are exempt from state lending and banking rules.
In Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 181 the Supreme Court considered the
application of preemption principles to state banking registration and the
examination requirements enforced by the state of Michigan against a
subsidiary of Wachovia Bank. 8 2 In accordance with Michigan law, Wachovia
Mortgage Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Wachovia Bank, was
registered and licensed to engage in lending operations in Michigan. 8 3 As the
Supreme Court noted, consistent with state law, "Wachovia Mortgage was
required, inter alia, to pay an annual operating fee, file an annual report, and
open its books and records to inspection by [state] examiners." 8 4 The Court
construed the National Bank Act (NBA) and determined that an analysis of
the regulations was not necessary because the NBA authorized the activities of
national banking subsidiaries:
The NBA is thus properly read by OCC to protect from state
hindrance a national bank's engagement in the "business of banking"
whether conducted by the bank itself or by an operating subsidiary,
empowered to do only what the bank itself could do. The authority to
engage in the business of mortgage lending comes from the NBA,
§ 371, as does the authority to conduct business through an operating
subsidiary. That Act vests visitorial oversight in OCC, not state
regulators.... North Carolina law [Wachovia Bank's home state], all

178. In amending its regulations with respect to preemption, the OCC made clear that the
amendments pertained to both OCC-regulated entities as well as their subsidiaries. See Bank
Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1,904, 1,913 (Jan. 13,
2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007-7.4009, 34.3).
179. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
180. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 21 (2007).
181. Id. at 1.
182. Id. at7.
183. Id. at 7-8.
184. Id. at 8 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1657-.1658, .1671 (West 2002),
493.54, .56a(2), (13) (West 2005)). Wachovia Mortgage was subject to these requirements because
it did not have a main office or branch office within the state; had it had such office or offices it
would have been exempt from these requirements. Id. (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 445.1656(1), 445.1679(1)(a) (West 2002), 493.52(a) (West 2005) (amended 2007), 493.53a(d)
(West 2005)).
185. Ch. 106, 13 Star. 99 (1864) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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agree, governs incorporation-related issues .... And the laws of the
States in which national banks or their affiliaties are located govern
matters the NBA does not address. But state regulators cannot interfere
with the "business of banking" by subjecting national banks or their
OCC-licensed operating subsidiaries to multiple audits and surveillance
under rival oversight regimes.I16
One of the premises behind the Court's decision was the belief that
subsidiaries of national banks are "subject to the same terms and conditions" as
national banks. 187 Yet, one significant gap in coverage between federally
regulated banks and their subsidiaries is the fact that parent companies have the
discretion to include their affiliates in the parent companies' examination under
the CRA 88
1
a relevant point when assessing state regulators' abilities to
supervise and to combat predatory lending.
The point of this brief review is not to question the validity of federal
regulations that assert preemptive authority over state regulations to police
predatory lending or to criticize the Court's decision in Watters. I leave that to
others. In the words of one state attorney general, however, the decision to

186. Watters, 550 U.S. at 21 (citations omitted).
187. Id.
188. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. The Court's use of the term
subsidiary" does not seem to undercut this assessment. Under the OCC's CRA
regulations, the term "affiliate" would appear to include a subsidiary:
(a) Affiliate means any company that controls, is controlled by, or is under common
control with another company. The term "control" has the meaning given to that term in
12 U.S.C. 1841(a)(2), and a company is under common control with another company if
both companies are directly or indirectly controlled by the same company.
12 C.F.R. § 25.12 (2008).
Furthermore, the OCC's own guidance suggests that the term affiliate is meant to include
subsidiaries. Compare COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, RELATED ORGANIZATIONS:
COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK 5 (2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/
RelatedOrg.pdf ("Generally, an 'affiliate' is an entity that controls a bank, that is controlled by a
bank, or that is under common control with a bank."), with id. at 7-18 (citations omitted) (defining
three types of subsidiaries-operating, financial, and statutory-as being owned or controlled, at
least in part, by a regulated institution).
189. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Damming Waiters: Channeling the Power of Federal
Preemption of State Consumer Banking Laws, 35 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 916 (2008) ("[The
Watters Court] not only affirmed the substance of the Preemption Regulation, but it also
unequivocally adopted the OCC's theoretical framework for the broadest possible preemption
powers for national banks."); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the
Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer
Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2004) (arguing that the OCC's preemption
rules "will do great harm to the state banking system"); Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted
Regulatory Preemption of Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2274, 2275 (2004)
(criticizing federal regulators' exercise of preemptive authority over state predatory lending laws).
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preempt state predatory lending laws, as endorsed by the Court, "took
50
190
sheriffs off the beat at a time when lending was becoming the Wild West."'
D. The Lack of CRA Oversight
The examination process, the first line of defense under the CRA, has
become little more than ceremonial, as over 98% of banks now receive either an
"outstanding" or "satisfactory" score. 191 As data compiled by the National
Community Reinvestment Coalition shows, in 1990, just under 10% of banks
92
received either a score of "needs to improve" or "substantial noncompliance."
From 1990 through 1994, this figure was nearly halved, dropping to just over
5%.193 In one year, it was halved again, to 2.6%.194 By 2002, it was halved
again, to 1.1%. 195 During the height of the subprime mortgage market, the
figures were 0.7% for 2003, 0.8% for 2004, and 1.0% for 2005.196
A review of the CRA challenge process-when groups can interject their
views on bank activities and ask regulators to block proposed bank
applications-further exposes the regulators' hands off approach to oversight of
CRA matters in general. CRA challenges are virtually nonexistent, and when
groups do file challenges, regulators often overrule the challenges and rubber
stamp the applications. Challenges to bank applications on CRA grounds are
relatively rare, and denials of bank applications on CRA grounds are virtually
nonexistent.' According to an analysis by the Treasury Department, from 1985
through 1999, less than 0.8% (692 out of 92,177) of bank applications subject 1to
98
the CRA received any adverse comment, either on CRA or other grounds.
Regulators denied only 8 applications of the 692 for any reason, with 4% of
those 692 withdrawn by the bank and 1% returned. 199 At the end of the day,
regulators denied 8 out of 92,177 bank applications on any grounds (or less than

190. Jo Becker etal., White House Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
21, 2008, atAl.
191. The Community Reinvestment Act: Thirty Years of Accomplishments, but Challenges
Remain: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on FinancialServices, I 10th Cong. 194 (2008) (statement
of John Taylor, President and Chief Executive Officer, National Community Reinvestment
Coalition).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Barr, supra note 23, at 586 n.342 (citing TREASURY DEP'T, APPLICATIONS
SUBJECT TO CRA THAT WERE PROTESTED ON CRA GROUNDS (2000)).
198. Id.
199. Id.
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.01% of all bank applications) during this fifteen-year period. 200 More recent
evidence from the Federal Reserve reveals that that body received 13,500 bank
applications from 1988 through May 2007, and only 8 of them, less than .06%,
were denied on grounds 2described
as "unsatisfactory consumer protection and
0
'
issues."
needs
community
Even when groups or individuals raise CRA challenges, the regulators' near
indifference to CRA concerns is apparent. Richard Marsico examined decisions
by the Federal Reserve and the OCC from 1997 through 2003 in which
regulators reviewed a bank applicant's CRA record. This analysis revealed, at
best, a cursory analysis of CRA issues. 2 02 Marsico summarized his findings as
follows:
The decisions did not use a fixed set of evaluative criteria and used
subjective standards for evaluating bank lending. The decisions
generally listed facts about the bank's lending, emphasized strengths
and excused weaknesses, and did not disclose the reasoning they
employed in reaching their conclusions. In some decisions, the agency
acknowledged the accuracy of critical public comments about bank
lending, but approved the applications without explaining the reason
the criticism was not sufficient to deny the application. Finally, the
agencies did not take the opportunity when considering the applications
to encourage banks to improve weaknesses in their lending records. 203
Whether banks deserved the grades they received or whether regulators
should have approved the overwhelming number of bank applications are
questions beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, these processes have
become less than meaningful measures of banks' conduct, safety, and
soundness. If the processes had been meaningful, perhaps at least some of the
most harmful effects of the subprime crisis would not have transpired.
V.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE

CRA

One may believe that the CRA is too amorphous, that the Act leaves banks
with little guidance on what practices they should undertake, that community

200. Id.
201. Foreclosures at the Front Step of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform,
I I0th Cong. (2007) (statement of Sandra Braunstein, Director, Division of Consumer and
Community Affairs).
202. See MARSICO, supra note 51, at107-13 (citations omitted).
203. Id.at107. One way regulators could have taken into account subprime lending would
have been to assess such lending for safety and soundness.
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groups are unable to apply the pressure necessary to leverage more significant
gains under the Act, or that the standard-setting approach of the Act is just right.
There is no question, however, that from the perspectives of the courts-based
on the loose terms contained in the CRA and the attenuated chain of harms that
might flow from a bank's failure to comply with those terms-the CRA is all
but beyond judicial review. And the inability on the part of advocates to have
regulators' conduct reviewed in court leaves regulators with unfettered
discretion to make the CRA say what they want it to say and do what they want
it to do. This boundless discretion has weakened enforcement of the CRA,
leaving such enforcement solely in the hands of the regulators. The following is
a recounting of the few cases from the past ten years in which federal courts
have reviewed regulators' decisions to reject CRA challenges. After the courts
soundly rejected a series of actions in the late 1990s, few community advocates
have sought judicial review of these regulators' decisions, certainly because
such actions seemed futile.
While there have been a handful of cases in which individuals or
community groups have attempted to challenge regulators' approval of bank
applications despite challenges under the CRA, two cases stand out as examples
of the typical case a community group might bring and the allegations it might
raise in such a legal challenge: Lee v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Lee 1)204 and Lee v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(Lee 11). 2 05 The results of both cases demonstrate that courts have imposed
serious hurdles before individuals and
groups seeking to obtain judicial review
2 6
of agency decisions under the CRA. 0

204. 118 F.3d 905 (2d Cir. 1997).
205. No. 95 Civ. 7963(LMM), 1997 WL 570545 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1997).
206. The Lee cases involved community leaders and community-based organizations filing
CRA challenges with the regulators and then seeking to have those challenges reviewed in federal
court. Lee 1, 118 F.3d at 909; Lee 11, 1997 WL 570545, at *1. Other cases under the CRA have
arisen in different contexts, and the holdings in those decisions are likely unique to the particular
circumstances of each case. See, e.g., Kaimowitz v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 940
F.2d 610, 611-12 (11 th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that the petitioner did not have standing to
challenge the bank acquisition based on his allegation of reputational harm: the petitioner had
represented to minority clients that the bank had poor CRA records, but the regulators granted the
bank's application despite those allegedly poor CRA records); Exch. Bank v. Dir. of the Office of
Thrift Supervision, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (holding that a bank did not have
standing to file a judicial challenge to a rival bank's application under the CRA because purpose of
the CRA was to promote, not thwart, competition); Washington v. Office ofthe Comptroller ofthe
Currency, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11474, at *10-12 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 1987) (rejecting a
community group's challenge to a bank application's approval where the group failed to document
the bank's allegedly poor CRA record and where the OCC's decision to grant approval "was not
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law");
Corning Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 571 F. Supp. 396, 403-04 (E.D. Ark.
1983) (reviewing a bank's judicial challenge to the approval of a rival bank's application and
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These two cases arose in the context of a complex transaction involving the
1996 merger of two banking giants, Chase Manhattan Corporation and
Chemical Banking Corporation.2 0 Matthew Lee, a long-time CRA advocate
and executive director of the grassroots community group, Inner City Press
(ICP), together with individual members of ICP and the organization acting in
its own capacity, filed a challenge under the CRA to different aspects of the
merger application 208
before the regulators, including the Federal Reserve, the
FDIC, and the OTS.
In Lee I, Lee and the other plaintiffs filed a series of CRA challenges before
the regulators, arguing that the bank applicants had failed to live up to their
obligations under the CRA, and as a result, the regulators should deny both
banks' applications. 20 9 The plaintiffs based their arguments both on Chase's and
Chemical's records pertaining to their lending practices in the South Bronx
(plaintiffs alleged that Chase and Chemical illegally excluded borrowers from
that community from their home mortgage lending) and Chase's practice of
requiring banking customers to have high minimum deposit requirements before
Chase would waive certain bank fees (which, plaintiffs argued, discriminated
against low-income customers). 2 1 Plaintiffs also asserted that the United States
Trust Corporation's (UST) failure to comply with HMDA's disclosure
requirements made it impossible for the regulators to evaluate UST's lending
Therefore, an accurate CRA review was impossible.
practices.
Additionally, plaintiffs argued that UST had improperly excluded lowand
2 13
moderate-income neighborhoods in New York City from its service area.
In Lee II, the plaintiffs challenged Greenpoint Bank's (Greenpoint)
application to purchase branches of Home Savings of America, FSB on the
grounds that Greenpoint had excluded the Bronx from its CRA service area,
was lending only to more affluent borrowers in the Bronx, was charging higher
interest rates to minority borrowers, and was planning to engage in capital
export of deposits through a newly acquired mortgage bank.2 14 These arguments
became the bases of the judicial challenges ultimately filed in both cases.

holding that the regulators complied with the CRA in approving the application), aff'd, 736 F.2d
479 (8th Cir. 1984).
207. See Lee 1, 118 F.3d at 909; Lee 11, 1997 WL 570545, at *1. Lee I also involved the
application of Chase to purchase a portion of the United States Trust Corporation. 118 F.3d at 908.
Lee 11 also involved a legal challenge to a covered transaction by Greenpoint Bank, together with
certain aspects ofthe Chase-Chemical merger. 1997 WL 570545, at *3.
208. Lee 1, 188 F.3d at 909.
209. Id.
210. Id. at915.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Lee 11, No. 95 Civ. 7963(LMM), 1997 WL 570545, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1997).
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Any legal challenge to a regulator's decision under the CRA must be filed
under a different law because there is no private right of action under the
CRA. 2 15 Accordingly, the plaintiffs had to challenge the decisions approving
different aspects of the merger through
various routes. In Lee •, two
•
•216actions
were filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit under
section 9 of the Bank Holding Company Act217 (BHCA) and section 10(j) of
HOLA, 2 18 both of which create
private
rights of actions for an "aggrieved party"
•
19
to challenge bank applications. The two actions filed in the court of appeals
220
sought to overturn three decisions of the Federal Reserve and one of the OTS.
By the express terms of those statutes, plaintiffs must file such. •challenges
in the
221
circuit court where the "aggrieved party" maintains its business. Lee II was
filed under the Administrative Procedure Act, 22 2 challenging orders of the FDIC
and the OCC
approving a series of bank applications over the objection of the
223
plaintiffs.
Prior to reaching the merits of the plaintiffs' challenges, the court of
appeals in Lee I, at the request of the banks, took up the issue of the plaintiffs'
standing to sue.224 A critical question for the court was whether the plaintiffs
could link any past harm they had suffered to the regulators' decisions, and
whether the relief sought-overturning the regulators' decisions-would in
some way redress such past harm. 22 5 The court divided the plaintiffs into three
overlapping categories: "(1) individual residents of the South Bronx; (2)

215. Lee 1, 118 F.3dat913.
216. Id. at908 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467aj), 1848 (2006)).
217. 12 U.S.C. § 1848.
218. § 1467aj).
219. Lee 1, 118 F.3d at 910 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(j), 1848).
220. Id. at 908.
221. Id. at 910 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(j), 1848).
222. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006).
223. Lee 11, No. 95 Civ. 7963(LMM), 1997 WL 570545, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1997).
224. 118 F.3d at 910. At the time, the most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court of
the constitutional requirement of standing could be found in Bennettv. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
There, the Court found that there were three elements that comprised the "irreducible constitutional
minimum" of standing:
(1) that the plaintiff ha[s] suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a judicially
cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that there be a causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of-the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party
not before the court; and (3) that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Id. at 167 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). The courts in both
Lee I, see 118 F.3d at 910 (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167) and Lee 11, 1997 WL 570545, at *3
(quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167), made reference to this standard.
225. Lee 1, 118 F.3dat910-14.
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customers of Chemical (and now, presumably, Chase); and (3) various
community organizations."226 The court then described the bases for plaintiffs'
arguments concerning standing as follows:
First, [plaintiffs] contend that their "extensive participation" below
confers the right to challenge the outcomes of the various proceedings.
Next, [plaintiffs] allege that some unidentified members of JCP
"have... been denied credit from the banks in their community" and
"are likely to seek credit from banks in their community" in the future.
Because the [Federal Reserve] and OTS ignored the banks' allegedly
poor CRA performance, the argument goes, these individuals will be
less likely to obtain desired financial services. JCP and Lee also
contend that, as customers of Chemical, they stand to suffer 227
from the
anti-competitive effects of the merger of Chase and Chemical.
The court addressed each of these contentions, in turn, rejecting all of them.
The court first rejected the argument that participation alone before the
regulators was a sufficient ground to confer standing when the plaintiff simpy
alleges procedural irregularities in the administrative proceedings below.
Rejecting the plaintiffs' analogy to a claim brought under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 229 (NEPA), the court found that even
assuming some procedural defects below (which the court did not concede), the
plaintiffs would still have to show some cognizable injury, as participation23in
the administrative proceeding below "is only a starting point" in the analysis. 0
Turning next to the question of the other harms alleged by the plaintiffs, the
court described such harms as follows:
[Plaintiffs] vaguely allege that some unidentified members of JCP
have been denied credit in the past and that still other unidentified
members intend to apply for credit in the future. Notably absent from

226. Id at910.
227. Id at910-11.
228. Id. at 911 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572-73 nn.7-8).
229. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f(2000).
230. Lee 1, 118 F.3d at 911 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578; Committee to Save the Rio
Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 448-49 (10th Cir. 1996)). The Court determined that a decision
out of the District of Columbia Circuit only held that participation in the proceedings was a
prerequisite to review and not sufficient by itself for review. Id. (citing Jones v. Bd. of Governors
of Fed. Reserve Sys., 79 F.3d 1168, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). A subsequent decision of the D.C.
Circuit, in another judicial challenge brought by Matthew Lee and others, confirmed the D.C.
Circuit's view that mere participation in the bank application process does not confer Article III
standing to challenge that application in federal court. Inner City Press v. Bd. of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 130 F.3d 1088, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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either petition is an allegation that any of the banks involved in this
proceeding have been or will be involved in [plaintiffs'] plans. For
example, despite petitioners' allegations of racial discrimination and
their indictment of the [Federal Reserve] and OTS for their complicity
in such acts, not one member of JCP has come forward with so much as
an allegation, much less 23
evidence, that he or she has suffered from such
discriminatory practices. '
The court concluded that these allegations failed to meet the injury in fact
requirement of standing:
the plaintiffs failed to allege that such harm was
"actual or imminent."232
Turning to standing's second and third elements-causation and
redressability-the court concluded that causation and redressability for the
harms alleged were even harder burdens for plaintiffs to bear because they were
attempting, through the litigation,
,. 233 to influence the actions of third parties (the
banks) and not the regulators. The court then turned to the text of the CRA
and found that the Act failed to offer courts an avenue to remedy the plaintiffs'
alleged harms. The court described the statute as "amorphous" and "precatory"
and determined that the language of the statute-covered banks have a
"'continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local
communities in which they are chartered"'-does not constitute "a directive to
undertake
any particular program or to provide credit to any particular
• •
,,234
individual."
Given the language of the Act, which as the court further
described, "sets no standards for the evaluation of a bank's contribution to the
needs of its community," the plaintiffs could not meet the causation and
redressability prongs of the standing requreme.23

231. Lee 1, 118 F.3dat912.
232. Id. at 912 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564).
Petitioners relied on what the Second Circuit determined was dicta from the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at
911-12 (citing Kaimowitz v. Bd. ofGovernors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 940 F.2d 610 (1 th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam)). In KaimowitL, the court rejected a legal challenge to a Federal Reserve Board
decision to grant a bank application despite a CRA challenge to it, finding that the petitioner in that
action did not have standing. KaimowitL, 940 F.2d at 611, 614. The court reached this conclusion
because the petitioner was not an individual who stood to benefit from an improved CRA
performance by the bank in question: he was not a minority or low- or moderate-income person
that might benefit from an improved CRA performance of the applicant bank, did not reside in a
low- or moderate-income census tract, and had not sought or was not likely to seek a loan from that
bank. Id. at 613.
233. Lee 1, 118 F.3dat912-13.
234. Id. at913 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3) (2006)).
235. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-634, at 76 (1977) (Conf. Rep.)). The court also rejected
petitioners' other arguments related to standing-that the Chase-Chemical merger would have
anti-competitive effects-due to petitioners' failure to proffer facts that would establish standing
under such a theory. Id. at 913-14.
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Despite its rejection of the plaintiffs' standing to sue, the court assessed the
merits of the plaintiffs' contentions and found them insufficient to warrant the
relief plaintiffs sought. 36 For the most part, the court's decision on the merits of
plaintiffs' claims was procedural and consistent with the proper scope of review
of administrative determinations. 237 The court found that the record showed that
the regulators had considered the plaintiffs' arguments and had determined2 38
that
the arguments lacked a sufficient basis for rejecting the banks' applications.
Soon after the Second Circuit reached its decision in Lee I, the district court
in Lee II, which was entertaining the second legal challenge to other aspects of
the Chase-Chemical merger and the Greenpoint application, reached its
decision. The district court relied heavily on the Second Circuit's prior decision
on standing, even though the plaintiffs had refined their standing arguments
239 and
had interposed supplemental allegations in response to the Lee I holding.
Those supplemental allegations included the argument that several JCP
members had sought and been denied credit from Chase and had "'concrete
plans to reapply"' for such credit. 24 The court considered such "'concrete
plans"' to be speculative, and further noted that the plaintiffs had "fail[ed] to
allege that such future applications will likely be denied," and that such a failure
24 1
prohibited the plaintiffs from showing that they suffered "'injury in fact."'
Regarding the UST application, the plaintiffs alleged that they were able to
identify members of JCP who lived in residential buildings in the South Bronx
and institutions "'like UST"' that had denied loans to such members'
landlords.242 As a result, plaintiffs alleged that those residents had to "'endure
the deterioration and unsafe conditions caused by the owners['] inability to
obtain refinancing or capital."' 243 The plaintiffs also claimed that they could
identify members of JCP "'who live in buildings
whose owners would apply for
244
credit from UST if it served the Bronx."'
The court rejected these arguments as too speculative "to support a claim of
'injury in fact"' because the JCP members were not alleging that they would
patronize UST if it served the Bronx, but that their landlords would; therefore,
the landlords were the ones suffering the harm. 245 Furthermore, the court found

236.
237.
238.
239.
Lee 1,118
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id.at914.
See id.
See id.
at914-16.
No. 95 Civ. 7963(LMM), 1997 WL 570545, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1997) (citing
F.3d 910-14).
Id.
Id.
Id.at*6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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such allegations as "contingent" in nature (if UST served the Bronx, the
landlords would apply and be denied) and determined that the plaintiffs' claims
were "too tenuous to demonstrate 46concrete and imminent injury" sufficient to
satisfy the first prong of standing.
In terms of the challenged application of Greenpoint, the plaintiffs were on
even rockier terrain. The plaintiffs alleged that Greenpoint's application should
be denied on CRA grounds because the bank failed to serve the low- and
moderate-income borrowers in the South Bronx by excluding the Bronx from its
service area and lending only to borrowers of higher income. 247 Thus, based on
these allegations, the plaintiffs could not produce anyone from a low- or
moderate-income community in the South Bronx who had been denied a loan.
Instead, the plaintiffs argued that they had standing to challenge the regulators'
decision with respect to the Greenpoint application because ICP members had
been denied loans from other banks and had definite plans to seek credit from
Greenpoint were it to serve the Bronx. 248 Plaintiffs argued further that
Greenpoint's practices did, or had the potential to, impact adversely "'the
physical environs of all the residents of the South Bronx, rather than just those
who have been denied mortgage credit from Greenpoint or another retail
bank,"' and thus anyone "'forced to endure the negative consequences
of
249
Greenpoint's practices"' had standing to challenge the underlying orders.
The district court dispensed with these arguments in short order, finding
that the "unspecified 'potential' of adversely impacting the 'environs' where
ICP members reside is not the type of 'real or immediate' threat of injury
necessary to support an 'injury in fact."'' 250 The court went on to echo the
analysis by the court of appeals in Lee I, finding that the language of the CRA
itself offered little to plaintiffs for the establishment of causation and
redressability:
Thus, it is difficult to discern what effect, if any, an order of this Court
directing the FDIC and the OCC to comply with the CRA would have.
Even the allegations in plaintiffs' supplemental memorandum of law
fail to allege that the alleged individual denials of credit can be traced
to the FDIC's and OCC's failure to properly regulate the respective
financial institutions, nor that such denials would have been granted

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id.at*3.
Id.at*6.
Id.
Id.(citing City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)).
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had the FDIC
and OCC properly taken such institutions' records "into
25
account.",

1

Finally, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations that their
members would be more likely to obtain credit if the regulators were to enforce
the CRA and require the applicant banks' compliance with its terms was a
"wholly conclusory assertion [that was] insufficient and too speculative to
support either causation or redressability." 2 5 2 Because the plaintiffs failed to
show that the harm alleged could be "traced to the OCC's and FDIC's alleged
regulatory failures" or that the harm "would be redressed if the OCC and FDIC
took the applicant financial ...
institutions' records
into account," they
..
253 could not
meet the causation and redressability requirements of standing.
Unlike the
court of appeals, the district court did not address the
merits of the plaintiffs'
254
complaint, dismissing the claim for lack of standing.
As discussed previously, CRA examinations have become rote affairs, and
CRA challenges to bank applications are almost nonexistent. 255 This is
especially true since the decisions in Lee I and Lee II. In the end, the lack of
judicial review of agency action under the CRA diminished the ability of
community groups and advocates to monitor agency conduct under the Act.
Given the critical role the regulators play in enforcing the Act, the absence of
judicial review of examiner conduct, in turn, likely weakened the ability of the
CRA to meet its goals. At the end of the day, during a period of extreme
banking, regulators were unwilling to assess risky bank practices for their likely
impact on the communities the CRA was designed to protect. At the same time,
courts refused to review this lack of will. Given these twin failures, the CRA
proved a weak weapon against subprime lending's impacts on low- and
moderate-income communities.
VI. A CRA

FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY

The importance of the CRA's goal-ensuring that financial institutions
meet the needs of low- and moderate-income communities-has not diminished
in light of the present financial crisis. If anything, the failure of the banking
system to engage in sound lending practices with respect to these communities
was one of the events that triggered the crisis. Accordingly, the importance of
strengthening the CRA to protect against a repeat performance of such conduct

251.
252.
253.
254.
254.

Id. at *8 (citing Lee 1, 118 F.3d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1997)).
Id.
Id.
See id. at *8-9.
See supra Part IV.D.
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cannot be overstated. At the same time, the central and irreplaceable role banks
play in our financial system and the extent to which that role has evolved since
the CRA's passage require that the CRA must be revised to respond to the
challenges of the day, and those of tomorrow. Where deposit insurance served
as an important justification for the original CRA, the taxpayer rescue of the
financial system renews and deepens the federal commitment to banks, and
those banks' commitment to vital national interests, including the preservation
and enhancement of the financial life of all communities. With these sentiments
in mind, the following are several principals that could inform efforts to revise
the CRA for the twenty-first century.
A.

Broadeningthe CRA 's Reach

It is obvious that Congress must broaden the CRA's reach. At present, the
CRA applies to only a fraction of home mortgage lending generally, let alone
subprime lending (although subprime lending itself may be completely dead, at
least for the time being). An expansion of the scope of the CRA to cover all
financial institutions-not just depository institutions-and all bank loanswhether made in the same communities from which the institutions take their
deposits or not-is necessary. With globalization in the banking and finance
markets, the connection between a given bank's deposits and its investments has
been severed, and tethering the CRA's
reach to a bank's deposits is no longer
257
the only justification for the CRA.
Indeed, the Treasury Department's bank bailout, which to date has cost
U.S. taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars, has reaffirmed the federal
government's commitment to a strong and secure banking system. Just as

256. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, supra note 114, at 135 (finding that less than
30% of home purchase loans in 2000 were made by institutions covered by the CRA in their CRA
assessment areas).
257. Several commentators have discussed the transformation of the global banking industry
and potential legislative and regulatory responses. See, e.g., Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. & James H.
Freis, Jr., Fostering Competition in Financial Services: From Domestic Supervision to Global
Standards, 34 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 57, 58-66 (1999) (citations omitted) (discussing the United
States' legislative reaction to the globalization of banking); Allen N. Berger et al., Globali ation of
Financial Institutions: Evidence from Cross-Border Banking Performance, 2000 BROOKINGSWHARTON PAPERS ON FIN. SERVICES 23, 28-29 (discussing the correlation between the rise of
global trade and global financial services); Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, Implications of the
Globali ation of the Banking Sector: The Latin American Experience, NEW ENGLAND ECON. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 45, 47-60 (providing a history of banking crises in Latin America and detailing
the response of foreign banks to these crises); Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Cent.
Bank, The Role of Central Banks in a Globalised Economy (June 18, 2007), available at
http://www.bis.org/review/r070621b.pdf (explaining the role of central banks in light of the
proliferation of domestic free trade regimes in the last twenty years).
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federal deposit insurance was used decades ago to justify the adoption of the
CRA, the deepening of the federal commitment to the safety of the U.S. banking
industry strengthens the support for a deeper commitment of banks to the
communities they do serve or should serve. The deepening of this federal
commitment also justifies a strengthening of the CRA to bring it in line with the
current state of the banking industry. Receipt of funds through the Troubled
Asset Relief Program 25 (TARP) or other bailout funds should trigger an
examination when a bank engages in lending and other practices, not just when
the bank receives deposits. The Community Reinvestment Modernization Act of
2007,259 introduced in the House but never passed, proposed to expand the
scope of coverage of the CRA by expanding the definition of "assessment area"
in many contexts to include any community in which a financial entity covered
under the Modernization
•.260 Act held 0.5% of the market share of the activity
within that community. This is a good place to start.
B. PermittingState Enforcement
Federal involvement in the banking system has intersected with states'
efforts to regulate banks since the dawn of the Republic 26 1 with the First Bank
and Second Bank of the United States (which •were262ultimately dissolved-the
Second as a result of Andrew Jackson's presidency). After a brief interruption
in federal involvement in banking, it returned in the throes of the Civil War and
strengthened first after the Panic of 1907 and again during the Depression. 263 At
the same time, states maintained their own oversight role of financial
institutions doing business within their borders that were beyond the oversight
of federal supervisory agencies. 264 This dual banking system has important
functions, not the least of which is permitting state bank regulators to ensure

258.

For a review of the activity of the Treasury Department's TARP program, see CONG.

OVERSIGHT PANEL, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM 7-13 (2009),

available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-010909-report.pdf A review ofthis report might
lead one to suggest a topic for discussion, like one that Mike Myers's character, Linda Richman of
"Coffee Talk," see Saturday Night Live: Kirstie Alley with Tom Petty & the Heartbreakers(NBC
television broadcast Oct. 12, 1991), might introduce: The Troubled Asset Relief Program does not
seem to be dealing with troubled assets, may be offering little relief, and might not really be a
program. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra, at3-5.
259. H.R. 1289, 110th Cong. (2007).
260. Id.§§ 105(b)(1), 106(b)(1), 107(b)(1).
261. For an overview of the federal role in banking, see Jerry W. Markham, Banking
Regulation: ItsHistory and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 221 (2000).
262. See id.
at223-26.
263. See id.
at228-37.
264. See id.
at224-28.
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that local oversight priorities are met, that gaps in federal
oversight are filled,
2 65
and that experimentation and innovation are encouraged.
In fact, state attorneys general have been at the forefront of policing
predatory conduct, even in the face of OTS and OCC preemption. Most
recently, state officials in eleven states brought litigation against Countrywide
Financial Corporation. This litigation was ultimately settled by Bank of
America, which had purchased Countrywide in the interim. These actions
were settled, leading to a commitment by Bank of America to dedicate $8.4
billion towards refinancing predatory loans 2entered
into by Countrywide during
67
the height of the subprime mortgage frenzy.
In order to ensure that the benefits of the dual banking system are realized,
the Obama Administration must revisit regulatory preemption in the banking
industry. Real estate practices and values on the Upper East Side of Manhattan
are very different than in eastern Mississippi. A one-size-fits-all approach to
banking regulation is simply misguided. Now more than ever, the need is
apparent for more regulation, not less; stronger oversight, not weaker; and more
cops on the beat, not fewer. Accordingly, the OTS and the OCC, now under
new management, should review the preempting regulations to find the proper
balance between innovation, efficiency, and local priorities.
C. JudicialReview and Performance-BasedStandards
With respect to judicial oversight of the regulatory process, first and
foremost, Congress has to make clear that regulator conduct under the CRA
should be subject to judicial review. This can easily be accomplished by
granting an explicit right of review of agency decisions under the judicial
review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 26 8 Opponents of such a
move would argue that permitting judicial review would discourage banks from

265. Several commentators have presented overviews of the benefits of the dual banking
system. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, The Dual State Federal Regulation of FinancialInstitutions A
Policy Proposal,53 BROOK. L. REV. 53, 54-56 (1987) (discussing the benefits ofthe dual banking
system, including the reinforcement of checks and balances and the encouragement of state-bystate innovations in bank regulation); Wilmarth, supra note 189, at 257-65 (arguing that the
history of congressional banking legislation evinces an intent by Congress to preserve and promote
the dual banking system and noting that the dual banking system promotes competition between
states in banking regulation, promotes efficiency, and protects against regulatory hegemony);
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the FederalResponse, and the Case
for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1255 (1990) (arguing that
the dual banking system has fostered innovative and responsive banking regulation).
266. See Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide to Set Aside $8.4 Billion in Loan Aid, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at B1.

267.
268.

See id.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006).
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pursuing bank transactions that might otherwise lead to greater efficiencies and
to expanded banking services in the CRA's target communities for fear that
such transactions might be held hostage to litigation. But bank transactions are
always subject
269...to the threat of litigation by aggrieved parties looking to overturn
such acts. And while standing is a requirement that still must also be met,
community groups have the right to bring actions challenging bank decisions
under the CRA, either under the same provisions as the Lee I litigation or under
the APA, as in Lee 11.270 Congress should make federal judicial review explicit
under the CRA by making certain agency decisions reviewable
under the APA
271
and in federal district courts rather than in circuit courts.
If concerns still existed that the mere threat of litigation might discourage
banks from entering into covered transactions, another potential avenue for
review would be to make only the outcome of CRA examinations subject to
review. Therefore, there would be no threat that a judicial challenge would
hinder an otherwise beneficial bank transaction. Moreover, looking to whether
the CRA and its regulations would offer judges any bases to review agency
action, the regulators have provided a great deal of guidance to banks
and to the
• . 272
community on how the regulators conduct their CRA examinations. Judicial
review of the examination process would open that process up to greater
transparency, perhaps leading to more thorough and defensible reviews. As it
stands now, whether one can establish a correlation between the Lee decisions,
the surprising record of the regulators giving passing grades to nearly all banks
examined and the near irrelevancy of the CRA challenge process is subject to
debate. But making judicial review more available to community members and
groups could send a clear signal to regulators that their decisions are subject to

269. See, e.g., Lee 1, 118 F.3d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1997) (challenging bank applications under
the BHCA and HOLA); Lee 11, No. 95 Civ. 7963(LMM), 1997 WL 570545, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
15, 1997) (challenging a bank application under the Administrative Procedure Act).
270. See supra text accompanying notes 204-28.
270. Prosecuting these actions in the appellate courts is cumbersome. It also detracts from
the appellate docket of those courts. Cf Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1939)
(refusing to exercise original jurisdiction over an action by one state to collect taxes from citizens
of another state since doing so would place an enormous burden on the Court and interfere with its
appellate duties). For a critique of the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court as
inefficient and burdensome, see James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the
Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1590-92 (2001) (noting that
when the Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction it threatens its ability to efficiently and
effectively execute its functions as an appellate court). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury,
Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1989)
(discussing the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court).
272. See Community Reinvestment Act; Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding
Community Reinvestment, 74 Fed. Reg. 498, 499 (Jan. 6, 2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts.
25, 203, 228, 345, 563e).
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outside review, which hopefully would
generate thorough reviews of CRA
273
process.
examination
the
during
issues
Another innovation that might raise the stakes in the examination process,
and thus make it more of a focus of community group advocacy and more
amenable to judicial review, would be to make the outcome of the examination
process explicitly relevant to bank transactions through the adoption of
"performance-based" mechanisms within the CRA. 274 One way to do this might
be to make banks with outstanding CRA scores subject to a streamlined process
for approval of the covered applications and those with unsatisfactory scores
subject to another review within a short period of time. If the unsatisfactory
bank failed to improve after that second review, this approach would subject the

273. A number of scholars have argued that judicial review of agency conduct is valuable.
See, e.g.,
Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 787 (1999) (describing judicial review of agency rules and actions as one
of the democratic constraints on agency discretion); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy,
HeightenedScrutiny of the Fourth Branch:Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate
Reasonsfor Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 394-95 (arguing that agency decisions often
favor private interests over the public interest); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of
Aggressive JudicialReview of Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 525 (describing arguments in
support of aggressive judicial review of agency action, including the argument that such review
may improve the legality and regularity of agency decisions); Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, SelfInterest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 289 (1986) (arguing that
judicial review can decrease the risk of an agency acting in its own interests or in the interest of
private groups); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 653, 655, 678-79 (1985) (citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973))
(arguing that judicial review is justified by "fears of factional influence over governmental
processes" and that judicial review of agency action is appropriate where an agency's pattern of
inaction amounts to an abdication of that agency's statutory authority). But see Frank B. Cross,
Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1314 (1999)
(arguing that judicial review of agency action favors special interests over the public interest).
274. For an overview of performance-based regulatory regimes, see Stephen D. Sugarman
& Nirit Sandman, Fighting Childhood Obesity Through Performance-Based Regulation of the
Food Industry, 56 DUKE L.J. 1403, 1411-29 (2007). Sugarman and Sandman describe the
performance-based regulatory approach (PBR) as follows:
PBR does not merely lie back and wait for the market to bring about the socially desired
change. Instead, PBR selects the party itthinks is responsible for the problem and well
situated to solve it,
and then imposes on that party the obligation to do so. PBR is not
simple. Itrequires deciding who the appropriate subject of regulation is and what level
of performance is necessary. On top of that, itis also necessary to figure out how to
measure compliance and what penalties to impose for noncompliance. Yet, most of
these elements are broadly similar to the requirements of command-and-control
regulation. There, too, the regulator has to decide, for example, which polluters to target,
what to order them to change, how to decide whether they have done so, and what to do
about itif they have not. Hence, although some aspects of the regulatory process may be
more problematic than others depending upon the approach, the central difference is best
captured by the distinction between regulating inputs and outcomes.
Id.at1413.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss3/4

50

Brescia: Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure: The Financial Crisis and

2009]

COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT

bank to a •more rigorous
approval process for any CRA-covered transactions
2~75
••,
they might pursue. This may seem like a move towards a "safe harbor" for
certain banks that score high on their CRA examination, the type of approach
27 7
276
favored by Professor Peter Swire and opposed by Professor Michael Barr.
But giving the CRA examination greater weight in the approval process and
sending a signal to community groups that the examination process matters (and
is subject to judicial review) will likely improve citizen participation in the
process278 and improve the ability of the CRA to have what Barr has described
as a stronger
"expressive
effect" on bank and community involvement in the
,
279
Act's enforcement. It is also possible that different regulators could explore
using performance-based approaches in particular regions-like one or more of
the Federal Reserve System's Federal Reserve Districts 280 _or with particular
banks on a volunteer basis. Results from such experimental or voluntary efforts
could be reviewed to determine if such an approach leads to conduct that is

275. There are already performance-based mechanisms within the CRA, ushered in by the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB). Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Star. 1338 (1999) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). First, in the approach carried out by the regulators with
respect to banks with assets of over $250 million, the CRA examinations typically occur every
thirty-six months. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Frequently Asked Questions About
the Intermediate Small Bank Examination, http://www.occ.treas.gov/cdd/summer06/faq.html (last
visited April 14, 2009). Under the GLB, however, if a small bank receives a CRA rating of
"satisfactory," the next CRA examination will not occur for forty-eight months. 12 U.S.C.
§ 2908(a)(2) (2006). If a small bank receives an "outstanding" score on itsCRA examination, it
will not be reviewed for another 60 months. Id.In addition, the GLB granted new powers to banks
to create "financial holding companies," see 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(p), 1843(l)(1) (2006), which could
engage in certain activities like insurance and securities underwriting, id. § 1843(k)(1)(A),
(k)(4)(B), (k)(4)(E), but only if any of the bank's subsidiaries that are depository institutions
received atleast a "satisfactory" rating on their last CRA examination. Id.§ 1843(l)(2).
276. Swire, supra note 111, at349.
277. Barr, supra note 23, at521.
278. Id.at601.
279. Id.at604. Barr describes the expressive effect ofthe CRA as follows:
Because interpretation of CRA's standard requires community input, CRA expresses an
inclusive ideal of participation in rulemaking that should be counted among the law's
benefits. The expressive effects of law should be considered alongside the operational
effects. Even welfare economists acknowledge that expressive factors, like other nonconsequentialist factors, may be included in concepts of utility or well-being that
aggregate to social welfare. Thus, under either an expressive or a utilitarian theory of
value, to the extent that CRA's norms of inclusion resonate with low-income, moderateincome, and minority borrowers, such expression ought to be regarded as a benefit of
CRA. CRA conveys that borrowers who have been left out ofthe economic mainstream
ought to be treated with respect by lenders and regulators alike. This expressive function
of CRA can bring real benefits, as attested to by members ofthese communities.
Id.(footnote call number omitted).
280. For an overview of the Federal Reserve District system, see Federal Reserve Board,
The Structure of the Federal Reserve System, http://federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/frseri3.htm
(last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
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consistent with the needs of low- and moderate-income communities and safe
and sound banking practices.
Standing is a thornier issue, no doubt. But Congress has the power to create
cognizable harms, and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on standing seems to
have evolved since the Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife28'
the basis for the rulings in both Lee I and Lee 11. 282 Indeed, in April 2007, the
Court issued Massachusetts v. EPA, 283 a decision concerning global warming
that may indicate that standing jurisprudence has itself begun to thaw.
In this case, Massachusetts and several other plaintiffs brought an action to
compel the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate regulations
284
of so-called greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act (CAA).
Massachusetts alleged that the EPA's failure contributed to global warming and
endangered the Massachusetts coastline, which was, in part, owned by the
Commonwealth itself. 285 Under the CAA, the EPA has authority to issue
286
regulations• concerning
control of "air pollutants."
The EPA had chosen not to
•
287
issue rules with respect to these gases despite the plaintiffs' express request
that the EPA generate such rules.288 In seeking compliance with the CAA's
terms, Massachusetts was seeking first that the EPA make a determination that
greenhouse gas emissions are in fact pollutants, and second, assuming that the
EPA found that they are, that the EPA issue regulations pertaining to their
emissions. 289 Massachusetts claimed that the failure to make this determination
290
and issue these rules threatened the coastline of the Commonwealth.
Diving into the standing issue, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
recognized that Congress had authorized the type of suit in question: a challenge
to a failure on the part of the EPA to issue regulations under the CAA.
Quoting Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion from Lujan at length, he went on
to review the broad power of Congress to, in effect, confer standing under many
circumstances:

281. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
282. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
283. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
284. Id. at 505.
285. Id. at 515 (quoting Massachusetts. v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 65-66 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
286. Id. at 528 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006)).
287. Id. at 513-14 (citing Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines,
68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,930-33 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
288. Id. at510.
289. See id. at 505.
290. Id. at 522-23.
291. Id. at516.
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"Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of
causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed
before. In exercising this power, however, Congress must at the very
least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the
class of persons entitled to bring suit." We will not, therefore,
"entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public's nonconcrete interest in
29
the proper administration of the laws." 2
While the majority recited the Lujan standing elements of actual or
imminent injury, traceable to the defendant and redressable by the court, 293 the
opinion stressed,
[A] litigant to whom Congress has "accorded a procedural right to
protect his concrete interests,"-here, the right to challenge agency
action unlawfully withheld-"can assert that right without meeting all
the normal standards for redressability and immediacy." When a
litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if
there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injurycausing 2party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the
litigant.
The majority went on to recognize that Massachusetts met the "injury in
fact" element. Because the Commonwealth owned "'a substantial portion of the
state's coastal property,"' it had "alleged a particularized injury in its capacity
as a landowner.
Turning to causation, the Court noted that the EPA did not
argue that there is no causal connection between greenhouse gas emissions and

292. Id.at 516-17 (citations omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 580-81 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
293. Id.at517 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at560-61).
294. Id.at517-18 (citations omitted) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at572 n.7) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)(1) (2006)). Admittedly, the Court did note the "special position and interest of
Massachusetts" and the "considerable relevance" to the standing discussion of the fact that the
party seeking review was a sovereign state, id.at518, meaning that the state was entitled to
"special solicitude" in the standing analysis. Id.at520. At the same time, the Court noted that the
fact that Massachusetts owned "a great deal" of the coastline affected by the allegedly arbitrary
action of the EPA "only reinforces the conclusion that itsstake in the outcome of this case is
sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judicial power." Id.at519. Furthermore, the
Court went on to note that keeping Massachusetts's status as a sovereign state in mind, "it
is clear
that petitioners' submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts have satisfied the most demanding
standards of the adversarial process." Id.at 521. This language, all taken together, seems to
indicate that the Court was accepting that a lower showing was required of the state to establish
standing, but that Massachusetts had shown that itowned property affected by the challenged
action such that the "most demanding" standing test
could also be met.
295. Id.at522.
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global warming, but instead that the particular relief sought-to have the EPA
review such gases as pollutants and consider specifically whether to issue
regulations about new vehicles' emission of the gases-contributed
"insignificantly" to the harms plaintiffs were alleging. 296 The Court rejected the
EPA's contentions, however, indicating that even "a small incremental step" to
mitigate an injury gives rise to judicial review. 297 Finally, with respect to
redressability, the Court noted that even with expected increases in global
emissions from other parts of the world, a "reduction in domestic emissions [of
greenhouse gases] would slow
the pace of global emissions increases, no matter
298
what happens elsewhere."
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that a state that is also a landowner (and, in
some ways, precisely because it is a landowner) can challenge the following
conduct of a federal government agency: when a federal agency fails to
promulgate regulations,
. . . . . and
299 that failure contributed-however insignificantlyinjuries.
plaintiffs
to the
Admittedly, the literal ruling of the Court was that a state can bring such a
challenge, but that does not end the discussion. In Massachusetts, the Court was
addressing "procedural harms" and the power of Congress to confer standing to
challenge agency action that implicates those harms. 300 The Court has also

296. Id.at523.
297. Id.at524.
298. Id.at526.
299. For an assessment of the likely impact of the Court's discussion of standing in
Massachusetts v. EPA, see for example Jonathan H. Adler, God, Gaia, the Taxpayer, and the
Lorax: Standing, Justiciability, and Separation of Powers After Massachusetts and Hein, 20
REGENT U. L. REV. 175, 194-95 (2008) ("Massachusetts expands the ability of states, and perhaps
individuals, to invoke federal jurisdiction for fairly broad, undifferentiated harms... [and]
provides for further judicial oversight of executive compliance with relevant legal requirements.");
Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law's Growing Shadow, 2007
Sup. CT. REV. 111, 159 (2007) ("[T]he Court's decision may help plaintiffs establish standing
premised on the harms caused by climate change ....
"); Tyler Welti, Note, Massachusetts v.
EPA's Regulatory Interest Theory: A Victory for the Climate, Not Public Law Plaintiffs, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1751, 1751-52 (2008) (arguing that Massachusettsv.EPA creates a theory of standing that is
*potentially highly restrictive" of individual and state standing).
300. For a discussion of procedural harms giving rise to standing, see for example Zachary
D. Sakas, Footnotes, Forests, and Fallacy: An Examination of the Circuit Split Regarding
Standing in Procedural Injury-Based Programmatic Challenges, 13 U. BALT. J.ENVTL. L. 175,
176 (2006) (discussing procedural injury cases and exploring a circuit split over whether a
programmatic rule, rather than a "site-specific agency rule," provides plaintiffs standing in
procedural injury cases); Christopher T. But, Comment, ProceduralInjury Standing After Lujan v
Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CI. L. REV. 275, 277 & n.7 (1995) (exploring the different methods
courts have used in analyzing procedural injury standing, noting possible methods that courts could
use and evaluating these methods while considering the effects of Lujan); Miriam S. Wolok, Note,
Standingfor Environmental Groups: ProceduralInjury as Injury-in-Fact,32 NAT. RESOURCES J.
163, 164 (1992) (reviewing the development and application of procedural injury to create
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recognized this power in other opinions. 301 Even Justice Scalia recognized
Congress's power to confer this standing in Lujan, which rejected the standing
of individual plaintiffs who failed to allege that agency inaction would harm
them specifically-there was no nexus between those particular plaintiffs and
the harm sought to be prevented (there, the impact of environmental policies in
a foreign country that no one was alleged to have plans to visit). 30 2 Regardless
of the failure of a nexus between the conduct challenged and the alleged harm in
Lujan, Justice Scalia recognized the viability of a plaintiff s standing to sue for
procedural harm, provided that there is still some concrete injury flowing from
that harm, like owning property adjacent to the land affected by the disputed
agency conduct:
There is this much truth to the assertion that "procedural rights" are
special: The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect
his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the
normal standards for redressability and immediacy. Thus, under our
case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a
federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency's
failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he
cannot establish with any certainty that the statement will cause the
license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam will not be
completed for many years.303
Similarly, many low- and moderate-income communities have been and
will continue to be harmed by bank practices carried out during the height of the
subprime mortgage frenzy. The reduction in property values, of both foreclosed
properties and neighboring properties, is severe. 30 4 One study of the impact of
foreclosures in Chicago in the late 1990s showed that the property value of
single family homes within one-eighth of a mile of a foreclosed home were

standing for environmental groups (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir.
1990), rev'd, 504 U.S. 555 (1992))).
301. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) ("Congress may grant an express
right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.").
302. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564.
303. Id. at 572n.7.
304. See Eric C. Seitz, U.S. Subprime Crisis: HR 3915 A Far-Sighted Solution to the
Mortgage Crisis, 14 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 759, 764 (2008) (citing Luke Mullins, Nightmare on
Main Street, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Mar. 10, 2008, at 42). Foreclosed properties are often
sold at less than market value-this obviously impacts the appraised valuation of those
properties-but appraisals of neighboring properties also take into account the reduced property
values of nearby foreclosed homes, and thus the price from the "short" sale ofthe foreclosed home
impacts neighboring property values directly. See id.
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reduced from 0.9% to 1.136% in value per foreclosure, 305 and that each
foreclosed property reduced the value of neighboring properties by between
$159,000 and $371,000. 30 6 That study estimated that, in 1997 and 1998,
foreclosures in Chicago reduced property
•
P
07 values in the city as a whole by
between $598 million and $1.39 billion.
Studies of the current foreclosure
crisis predict a range of losses to homeowners
nationally at between $356
30 8
billion and $1.2 trillion in home values.
309
Because foreclosures are concentrated in certain communities and states,
the impact of foreclosures is devastating, creating a vicious cycle where the
reduction in property values places pressure on homeowners who wish to sell
their properties but do not wish to do so at a loss. Such potential sellers take
their homes off the market, and as a result, the only homes for sale in certain
communities are bank-owned properties, which will likely be sold at significant
losses, creating even greater downward pressure on neighboring property
values. Homeowners, watching home values plummet, may question the
wisdom of holding onto their homes that may be worth less than the debt they
are carrying, which can also lead to default and even more foreclosures.
Litigation is already underway in several cities challenging bank practices
that occurred during the height of the subprime frenzy, using antidiscrimination
and public nuisance theories.3 1 0 This litigation may reveal information about the
causal connection between lax oversight and unsound bank practices. Congress
should explore this issue and establish the connection between the scope of the
CRA, regulatory enforcement (or lack of enforcement) of its terms, bank
conduct in response, and the community impact that has resulted from all three.
If Congress was to create an explicit right of action for residents of communities

305.
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9 (2005), available at http://www.nw.org/foreclosuresolutions/reports/documents/
TGTNReport.pdf
306. Id. at 11.
307. Id. at 13.
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(2008),

available at

http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Subprime mortgages/defaultin
g on the dream.pdf (predicting a $356 billion loss in home value due to rise in foreclosures), with
GLOBAL INSIGHT, THE MORTGAGE CRISIS: ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPLICATIONS FOR METRO

AREAS 2 (2007), available at http://www.usmayors.org/metroeconomies/ 107/report.pdf
(predicting a $1.2 trillion total loss in home values due to the subprime mortgage crisis).
309. See Gregory D. Squires, Urban Development and Unequal Access to Housing Finance
Services, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 255, 263 (2008) (citing David Cho & Nell Henderson, Where the
Wolf Comes Knocking; Areas Already in Economic Distress Feel Rise in Housing Foreclosures
Most, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2007, at DI).
310. See Donna Leinwand, Cities Suing Lenders in Strategy Against Foreclosures, USA
TODAY, May 16, 2008, at 15A.
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adversely impacted by bank practices, and was to establish the link between
risky lending practices, neighborhood instability, and regulatory inaction,
plaintiffs could meet the requirements of harm, causation, and redressability. As
Justice Kennedy made clear in his concurrence in Lujan, language quoted with
31 1
approval by Justice Stevens in the majority opinion in Massachusettsv. EPA,
Congress can "define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give
rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before." 312 And Congress
313
should do just that in this context.
During the legislative debates concerning the original passage of the CRA,
the power of the regulators to deny bank applications, in addition to other
informal mechanisms regulators could use, were seen as methods by which the
regulators could "nudge," "influence," and "persuade" banks to lend in low- and
moderate-income communities. 314 Congress should explore this interplay
between formal and informal mechanisms for influencing banks to meet the
needs of low- and moderate-income communities. The connection between
enforcement of the CRA's goals (or lack thereof) and the fallout from the
subprime mortgage crisis offers an area ripe for congressional investigation and
intervention.

311. 549 U.S. 497, 516(2007).
312. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). For a discussion of Congress's power to confer standing,
within Article 11Ilimitations, see for example Sean Connelly, CongressionalAuthority to Expand
the Class of Persons with Standing to Seek Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 39 ADM. L.
REV. 139, 161, 163 (1987) (citing Sierra Club v.Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972)) (stating that
Congress can define injuries that satisfy Article III requirements and arguing that Congress has the
ability to expand standing to cover any person whose rulemaking request has been rejected by a
federal agency); James Dumont, Beyond Standing: Proposalsfor Congressional Response to
Supreme Court "Standing" Decisions, 13 VT.L. REV. 675, 678 (1989) (citing U.S. CONST. art.
I)
(explaining "how Congress may use th[e] authority [todefine the judicial power of the federal
courts] in the area of standing," arguing "that Congress may utilize that power to overcome
standing hurdles in the areas covered by each [constitutional] amendment," and arguing "that
under article I Congress may create 'legislative courts' entirely free of the 'case or controversy'
restrictions imposed on article III courts"); John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory
Standing, 42 DUKE L. J. 1219, 1226 (1993) ("IfCongress directs the federal courts to hear a case in
which the requirements of Article III are not met, that Act of Congress is unconstitutional
[because] Article III limits congressional power ....), Laura A. Smith, Justiciabilityand Judicial
Discretion: Standing at the Forefront of Judicial Abdication, 61 G. WASH. L. REV. 1548, 1563
(1993) (citing Kevin A. Coyle, Standing of Third Parties to Challenge Administrative Agency
Actions, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1083 (1988)) ("Congress ...is limited to overriding the prudential
considerations of standing. The Article III requirements must always be present.").
313. Although I am aware of no reported decision where a community group challenged the
results of a bank's CRA examination, there is no reason Congress could not explicitly state that
"any person" could challenge the results of those examinations and describe the impact of those
examinations and the benefits of judicial review of such examinations, thereby satisfying the
causation and redressability elements of standing.
314. 123 CONG. REC. 17,630 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
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Another unexplored issue is the possibility that community groups engaged
in advocacy to help stem the tide of foreclosures in their communities might
allege the harms the organizations themselves suffer. Under the Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman3 15 line of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that a
group itself can suffer cognizable harm that goes beyond any political goal of
that group if the group devotes agency resources to combating the challenged
conduct. Thus, a community group or association may sue on its own behalf
if the group meets the same standing test that applies to individuals.3 1 7 Inother
words, the group must demonstrate a "concrete and demonstrable injury to the
organization's activities." 318 The Havens Court held that a perceptible
impairment of a housing organization's "ability to provide counseling and
referral services" constitutes an actionable injury in fact, reasoning that this
impairment meets the injury in fact test because a concrete drain on resources is
a more plausible injury
than a conjectural "setback" to an organization's
3 19
abstract social interests.
As a result of Havens, circuit courts generally agree that an organization
meets Article III standing requirements where the organization can show that
the defendant's alleged violations caused it to divert resources from other
projects or devote additional resources to a particular project in order to combat
the alleged discrimination.3 2 0 In the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis,

315. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); Ass'n ofCmty. Orgs. for
Reform Now v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 1999); Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6
F.3d 898 (2d Cir. 1993).
316. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at379; see also Fowler, 178 F.3d at 350; Ragin, 6 F.3d at
898.
317. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at378. An association also has standing to sue on behalf of its
members if: "(a) itsmembers would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the
interests the association seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit." Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
318. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at379.
319. Id.
320. See, e.g.,
Fair Hous. Council of Suburban Phila. v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d
71, 78 (3d Cir. 1998) ("in deciding organizational standing questions after Havens, appellate courts
have generally agreed that where an organization alleges or is able to show-depending on the
stage of the proceeding-that ithas devoted additional resources to some area of its effort in order
to counteract discrimination, the organization has met the Article III standing requirement.");
Ragin, 6 F.3d at 905 (citing Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 379) (stating that an organization's
devotion of resources to investigating and attempting to remedy discriminatory advertisements was
sufficient harm to create standing to sue on the organization's behalf). One issue the circuits do not
agree on is whether the expense of bringing litigation to combat particular illegal acts (the very
litigation in which the standing issue has arisen) is sufficient to confer group standing under
Havens. Compare Walker v. City ofLakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1124 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) ("We will
not consider the time and money the [housing organization] has expended in prosecuting this suit
in deciding ifthe [organization] has standing ....),with Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss3/4

58

Brescia: Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure: The Financial Crisis and

2009]

COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT

housing counseling groups, legal services organizations, religious institutions,
and other charitable organizations are devoting significant amounts of time and
energy towards combating the effects of the crisis: increased foreclosures,
financial stress, evictions, and homelessness. 32 Such groups could explore the
possibility of bringing actions on their own behalf to combat predatory conduct
because 32of
2 the drain on organizational resources from responding to such
conduct.
VII. CONCLUSION

The subprime mortgage crisis was brought about by a series of forces that
coalesced in a perfect storm that is wreaking havoc in communities and
markets. It will have deep and long lasting effects. Some of those effects will be
felt most deeply and painfully in low- and moderate-income communities, the
communities that were supposed to stand to benefit from the motives behind the
CRA: to bring much needed capital investment to communities too often left
behind by finance and credit. Tragically, when that credit ultimately came to
those very communities, the credit was all too often dangerous and ultimately
harmful. The CRA was not to blame for the introduction of that harmful
product, however. Rather, the CRA was powerless to prevent the crisis, given
the way the Act has been interpreted and enforced.
The benefits that banks receive from the federal government, most notably
federal deposit insurance, were offered as the original justifications for the
CRA. Yet financial institutions look very different now than they did in 1977,
and the connection between bank deposits and bank lending is not always clear.
The fact that nondepository institutions carried out much of the riskiest
subprime lending is a perfect example of this phenomenon.

1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that the mere fact that the organization lost the opportunity to
provide additional or increased counseling because it had directed its resources toward the lawsuit
constituted a cognizable injury).
321. See, e.g., J. Craig Anderson, Demandfor Assistance Soars as Foreclosures, Layoffs
Take Toll: Charities Struggle to Provide for Those Left Homeless for the Ist Time, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Dec. 27, 2008, (noting increased demand for assistance from nonprofit groups in wake
of financial crisis and increase in foreclosures).
322. For a discussion of organizational standing after Havens Realty, see for example
Jeanne A. Compitello, Organizational Standing in Environmental Litigation, 6 TOURO L. REV.
295, 297, 304-05 (1990) (arguing that because public policy is implicated in environmental
concerns and disputes, courts should extend organizational standing in the context of
environmental litigation); Lawrence Gerschwer, Informational Standing Under NEPA:
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The federal government's renewed commitment to a sound and secure
banking industry, exemplified by the hundreds of billions of dollars in relief
currently being channeled to that sector (which the government believes will
ultimately benefit all communities), represents a newer, indeed broader, basis
upon which to ensure that banks, and all financial institutions, meet the needs of
all communities. A CRA for the twenty-first century will strengthen the banking
industry, not weaken it, and will ensure that the renewed federal commitment to
the banking industry will reflect a commitment not just to the banks, but also to
the communities-all communities-those banks are supposed to serve.
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